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Jousting Over Jurisdiction: Sovereignty and International Law in Late Nineteenth-
Century South Asia 
Priyasha Saksena* 
 
In 1879, the Government of India passed the Elephant Preservation Act mandating that 
individuals acquire a government-issued licence to engage in the capture of wild elephants. A 
year later, it promulgated a set of rules to make the British Indian legislation applicable to an 
area that included Keonjhar,1 one of the 600-odd ³princely states´ that covered about two-fifths 
of the area and one-third of the population of South Asia under British rule.2 The princely states 
were ruled by indigenous rulers and were legally distinct from directly-ruled British India.3 The 
relationship between the states and the British Government4 was mediated by political officers 
ZKR ZHUH SRVWHG DW WKH VWDWHV¶ FRXUWV WR ³DGYLVH´ WKH SULQFHV RQ KRZ WR UXOH while the 
Government of India exercised certain functions, such as defence and external affairs, on the 
SULQFHV¶behalf.5 Despite being subjecWWR%ULWLVK³LQIOXHQFH´Dhanurjai Narayan Bhanj Deo, the 
                                                 
*
 Priyasha Saksena is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Leeds. She would like to thank Rabiat Akande, Sunil 
Amrith, Jane Bestor, Aphrodite Giovanopoulou, Angma Jhala, David Kennedy, Duncan Kennedy, Samuel Moyn, 
Henry Yeomans, and the editor and three anonymous reviewers of the Law and History Review for their thoughtful 
feedback on earlier drafts of this article. Versions of this article were presented at various forums; the author is 
particularly grateful to audiences at the Workshop on Protectorates and Semi-Colonialisms in Comparison, Inter-
Asia Initiative, Yale University (February 13, 2016) and the Institute for Global Law and Policy Workshop, Madrid 
(July 17-23, 2016). Research for this article was funded by the Lakshmi Mittal and Family South Asia Institute, 
Harvard University; the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University; and Harvard Law School 
International Legal Studies. 
1
 Letter from the Superintendent, Orissa Tributary Mahals to the Political Secretary, Government of Bengal, 15 May 
1882, IOR/P/2034, Proceedings of the Government of Bengal in the Political Department, June 1883, no. 26. In this 
article, I use material from the India Office Records, Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections, British Library, London 
(IOR); European Manuscripts, Asia, Pacific, and Africa Collections, British Library, London (Mss Eur); and the 
National Archives of India, New Delhi (NAI). 
2
 These statistics exclude Burma and Ceylon. The exact number of princely states varied over time and the very 
FDWHJRU\RI³SULQFHO\VWDWH´UHPDLQHGFRQWHVWHG6HH,DQ&RSODQGThe Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 
1917-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 8; and Barbara Ramusack, The Indian Princes and 
their States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. 
3
 British India was directly administered by the British Crown through the Viceroy and Governor-General, who was 
the executive head of the Government of India and subject to the control of Parliament through the Secretary of 
State for India, a member of the British cabinet.  
4
 , XVH WKH WHUP ³%ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQW´ WR UHIHU WR YDULRXV OHYHOV RI %ULWLVK DXWKRULW\ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR 6RXWK $VLD
including the Crown, the Secretary of State for India, the India Office in London, the Government of India, the 
Governments of various British Indian provinces, and British political officers in the princely states. 
5
 Ramusack, The Indian Princes and their States, 53. For analyses of the early development and working of this 
system, see K. N. Panikkar, British Diplomacy in North India: A Study of the Delhi Residency, 1803-1857 (New 
Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968); Michael H. Fisher, Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency 
System, 1764-1858 %RPED\2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVDQG0LFKDHO+)LVKHU³'LSORPDF\LQ,QGLD-
  2 
maharaja (ruler) of Keonjhar, vociferously protested WKH*RYHUQPHQWRI,QGLD¶Vmove, arguing 
WKDWKHKDGDQ³DEVROXWH´ULJKWWRFDSWXUHHOHSKDQWVIRXQGZLWKLQKLVWHUULWRU\ZLWKRXWUHTXLULQJD
licence issued by a British Indian authority. British Indian legislation, he contended, did not 
apply to the princely states on account of their separate legal status; any extension of such laws 
would breach the treaties made by the British with his predecessors and the sanads (British 
decrees offering protection to an Indian prince) issued to him.6 
We can read this vignette in a number of ways: as an anecdote about the decadent lives of 
the Indian princes, obsessed with activities like hunting DQGW\SHFDVWDV³2ULHQWDOGHVSRWV´E\WKH
British; as a tale of defiance by a high-minded maharaja against the might of the British Empire; 
or as an account of a contretemps between a princely state and the British Government over 
crucial natural resources.7 But the case, like scores of others in a legally uneven empire,8 raised 
broader questions about the legal status of the princely states and the nature and extent of the 
powers exercised by the princes and the British Government. These issues remained deeply 
controversial and heavily debated throughout colonial rule. What was the nature of the 
relationship among the state of Keonjhar, the Government of India, and the British Crown? Did 
the British have the right to prevent the maharaja of Keonjhar from capturing elephants within 
his territory? What rights did the maharaja enjoy within his own territory, in British India, and in 
Britain? Conversely, what powers did the British exercise within Keonjhar territory? What law 
governed the relationship between the princely states and the British Government ± national, 
imperial, or international law? Even a seemingly innocuous dispute over elephants raised tangled 
questions of sovereignty, of empire, and of international law.   
Using two late nineteenth-century disputes (over criminal jurisdiction and over 
jurisdiction over telegraph lines) as case studies, I examine debates over the legal status of the 
princely states to tease out insights for the broader history of the doctrine of sovereignty. Delving 
                                                                                                                                                             
´LQ%ULWDLQ¶V2FHDQLF(PSLUH$WODQWLFDQG,QGLDQ2FHDQ:RUOGVF-1850, ed. H. V. Bowen, Elizabeth 
Mancke, and John G. Reid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 249-81. 
6
 Letter from the maharaja of Keonjhar to the Superintendent, Orissa Tributary Mahals, 4 January 1882, 
IOR/P/2034, Proceedings of the Government of Bengal in the Political Department, June 1883, no. 26.  
7
 For a discussion of the economic significance of elephants, see Vijaya Ramadas Mandala, ³7KH 5DM DQG WKH
3DUDGR[HVRI:LOGOLIH&RQVHUYDWLRQ%ULWLVK$WWLWXGHVDQG([SHGLHQFLHV´ The Historical Journal 58 (2015): 101-
109.  
8
 The British Empire was an assemblage of disparate legal entities over which the British exercised different levels 
of sovereign power. By the early twentieth century, when the Empire reached its greatest extent, these territories 
included dominions, colonies, protectorates, protected states, and mandates. For an overview of the differences in 
the legal positions of these entities, see Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Governments of the British Empire (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1935).  
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into the legal arguments made by British colonial officials and princely state representatives, I 
trace the two diametrically opposed conceptions of sovereignty articulated in these jurisdictional 
conflicts: divisible and flexible or absolute and territorial. As I will elucidate later in this article, 
analysing both British and princely legal contentions illustrates WKH ³GRXEOHG´ nature of 
sovereignty as a concept that was and remains inherently capable of being defined in two ways.9 
By invoking the language of sovereignty in contrasting ways to support their differing visions of 
global order, British and princely state officials also attempted to reconfigure the boundaries 
DPRQJ³QDWLRQDO´³LPSHULDO,´DQG³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´ODZExploring these disputes and debates is, 
therefore, key to understanding international law itself.    
Scholars have long noted the significance of interrogating the jurisdictional politics of 
empire to understand the creation of the modern state-dominated international legal order.10 In 
colonial South Asia too, as the Keonjhar case demonstrates, controversy over the scope of rights 
and the degree of powers in the context of the princely states was rife and generated a series of 
jurisdictional disputes11 that became linked to broader questions about whether and to what 
H[WHQWWKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVZHUH³VRYHUHLJQVWDWHV´RUVLPSO\³KROORZFURZQV´12 and the extent of 
                                                 
9
 Relying on the idea of linguistic indeterminacy, American legal realists have long argued that law is mutable, a 
product of human will, and a mHDQV WRDFKLHYHVRFLDOJRDOV6HH WKHRYHUYLHZLQ+XJK&ROOLQV³/DZDV3ROLWLFV
3URJUHVVLYH $PHULFDQ 3HUVSHFWLYHV´ LQ Introduction to Jurisprudence and Legal Theory: Commentary and 
Materials, ed. James Penner, David Schiff, and Richard Nobles (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002), 279-333. 
10
 In her pioneering work on jurisdictional disputes in legally diverse empires, Lauren Benton argues that plural 
legal orders in which individual litigants attempted to take advantage of imperial fragmentation gave way in the 
nineteenth century to a state-GRPLQDWHG RUGHU DV HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK WKH VWDWH¶V OHJDO LQVWLWXWLRQV UHLQIRUFHG WKH
authority of the colonial state itself. See Lauren Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World 
History, 1400-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 148-49.  
11
 Lauren Benton provides an overview of the struggles of British officials to classify the princely states by 
analysing a late nineteenth-FHQWXU\ FULVLV LQ WKH VWDWH RI%DURGD6HH/DXUHQ%HQWRQ ³)URP ,QWHUnational Law to 
Imperial Constitutions: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereignty, 1870-´Law and History Review 26 (2008): 595-
619. She also discusses these endeavours, linking them with the discourse about the backwardness of hill regions, in 
Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 222-78. Eric Lewis Beverley traces jurisdictional conflicts along the border 
between the state of Hyderabad and Bombay in British India as well as Hyderabadi attempts to assert sovereignty 
over urban spaces. See Eric Lewis Beverley, Hyderabad, British India, and the World: Muslim Networks and Minor 
Sovereignty, c. 1850-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 186-255. Beyond the princely states, 
there is also work on the disputes generated by the lumpiness of sovereignty in the frontier regions of British India. 
6HH &KULVWRSK %HUJPDQQ ³&RQIOXHQW 7HUULWRULHV DQG 2YHUODSSLQJ 6RYHUHLJQWLHV %ULWDLQ¶V 1LQHWHHQWK-Century 
Indian EmpiUH LQ WKH .XPDRQ +LPDOD\D´ Journal of Historical Geography 51 (2016): 88-98; and Reeju Ray, 
³,QWHUUXSWHG6RYHUHLJQWLHVLQWKH1RUWK(DVW)URQWLHURI%ULWLVK,QGLD-´Modern Asian Studies 53 (2019): 
606-32.  
12
 In an early influential study, Nicholas Dirks argued that British colonialism preserved only the appearance of the 
pre-colonial regime, while there was a total collapse of earlier political structures and processes. The crown, he 
FRQWHQGHGZDV³KROORZ´DQGWKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVZHUHUHGXFHGWR³WKHDWUHVWDWHV´REVHVVHGZLWKWKHV\PEROVRISDVW
glory. See Nicholas Dirks, The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge 
8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV  )RU D PRUH UHFHQW VWXG\ PDNLQJ D VLPLODU DUJXPHQW VHH %KDQJ\D %KXN\D ³7KH
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%ULWLVK³SDUDPRXQWF\´13 in the region. As a result, schemas of sovereignty became particularly 
significant in defining the relationship between the princely states and the British Government.  
The concept of sovereignty lies at the heart of much of the contemporary literature on the 
relationship between international law and empire. 14  'XULQJ WKH ³DJH RI HPSLUH´ 15  many 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ\HUVHQYLVDJHGDZRUOGFRPSRVHGRIVWDWHVWKDWZHUHUHFRJQL]HGDV³FLYLOL]HG´
by those already part of the international community. Late nineteenth-century international law, 
then, was structured around the dichotomy between ³FLYLOL]HG´ (XURSH DQG WKH ³XQFLYLOL]HG´
non-(XURSHDQ ³RWKHU´ ZLWK VRYHUHLJQW\ EHLQJ GHILQHG VR DV WR H[FOXGH QRQ-Europeans.16 As 
Lauren Benton notes, this conceptualization did not clarify how entities like the princely states 
                                                                                                                                                             
Subordination of the Sovereigns: Colonialism and the Gond Rajas in Central India, 1818-´ Modern Asian 
Studies 47 (2013): 288-317. Other histories have more complicated notions of indigenous agency, the state, and 
sovereignty. Some scholars argue that the princely states provided the quintessential example of indigenous 
resistance to colonialism. See Hira Singh, Colonial Hegemony and Popular Resistance: Princes, Peasants, and 
Paramount Power (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998). Another stream of scholarship focuses on the construction 
RI³DOWHUQDWLYHPRGHUQLWLHV´ LQ WKHSULQFHO\ VWDWHV WKURXJK WKHFHQWUDOL]DWLRQRISRZHUDQG LQFOXGH WKHDWWHPSWVRI
several states to manoeuvre the partial autonomy they enjoyed in the colonial context. See Shail Mayaram, Resisting 
Regimes: Myth, Memory and the Shaping of a Muslim Identity (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997); Manu 
Bhagavan, Sovereign Spheres: Princes, Education, and Empire in Colonial India  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003); Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004); Janaki Nair, Mysore Modern: Rethinking the Region under Princely Rule (New 
Delhi: Orient BlackSwan, 2012); and Beverley, Hyderabad, British India, and the World.  
13
 The doctrine of paramountcy can be traced to treaties that the English East India Company signed with some 
rulers in the early nineteenth century. Many treaties involved an acknowledgement by the states of British 
overlordship (for instance, a cession of the right to engage in diplomacy with foreign powers to the Company) in 
return for a measure of state autonomy. Later, this idea of overlordship found expression in the doctrine of 
paramountcy, which became the basis of British relations with all princely states regardless of whether a treaty had 
been signed. By virtue of being the self-GHFODUHG³SDUDPRXQWSRZHU´WKH%ULWLVKFODLPHGWRSRVVHVVERWKWKHULJKW
and responsibility to take decisions on issues such as defence and external affairs, and also to interfere in the internal 
DIIDLUVRIWKHVWDWHVWRPDLQWDLQSHDFHLQWKHUHJLRQ6HH)LVKHU³'LSORPDF\LQ,QGLD´-64. 
14
 Early scholarship examining this relationship focused on the role played by international law in the subordination 
of non-European peoples. See C. H. Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the East 
Indies (16th, 17th and 18th Centuries) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); T. O. Elias, Africa and the Development of 
International Law (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972); and R. P. Anand, New States and International Law (New Delhi: 
Vikas Publications, 1972). Starting with Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), the focus of critical scholarship has shifted to examining the 
effect that colonialism has had on the construction of international law doctrines like sovereignty. See, for instance, 
Duncan Bell, ed., Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and International Relations in Nineteenth-Century 
Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Benton, A Search for Sovereignty; Arnulf 
Becker Lorca, Mestizo International Law: A Global Intellectual History, 1842-1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford, Rage for Order: The British Empire and the Origins of 
International Law, 1800-1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri, and 
Vasuki Nesiah, ed., Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); and Jennifer Pitts, Boundaries of the International: Law and 
Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018). 
15
 I borrow this term from Eric Hobsbawm. See Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire: 1875-1914 (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1987).  
16
 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 33-35.  
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(and other similar sub-imperial polities), which both exercised sovereign powers and were 
subject to imperial authority, fit within the broader configuration.17 Benton argues that when 
faced with this problem, British colonial officials such as Henry Maine and Charles Lewis 
7XSSHUFUHDWHGDQHZMXULVSUXGHQFHRI³LPSHULDOODZ´with distinctive qualities; it ZDV³DK\EULG
of PXQLFLSDO ODZ DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKDW FRXOG HQFRPSDVV GLYLGHG VRYHUHLJQW\´18 In this 
scKHPH ³>U@DWKHU WKDQ signifying a quality that a state either possessed or failed to retain, 
VRYHUHLJQW\FRXOGEHKHOGE\GHJUHHVZLWKIXOOVRYHUHLJQW\UHVHUYHGIRUWKHLPSHULDOSRZHU´19 
7KH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI ³LPSHULDO ODZ´ KRZHYHU GLG QRW UHVROYH questions of sovereignty or the 
significance of international law for the princely states. Instead, the legal wrangle over their 
international status continued into the twentieth century.20  As Stephen Legg observes, these 
debates gained traction in the context of ,QGLD¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH /HDJXH RI 1DWLRQV and the 
controversy over whether international conventions applied to the princely states.21  
Amidst these jurisdictional tangles, scholars have traced British attempts to define 
sovereignty in a manner that would enable paramountcy to ultimately reside with the colonial 
state. Ian Copland and Barbara Ramusack describe how the legal manoeuvres of late nineteenth-
century colonial officials stripped the princely states of much of their sovereignty.22 Lauren 
Benton argues WKDWWKH%ULWLVKDGYRFDF\RI³GLYLVLEOH´VRYHUHLJQW\RIWHQRFFDVLRQHGWKH³RXWULJKW
                                                 
17
 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 238.  
18
 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 294.  
19
 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 245. For the argument that sovereignty was consolidated, albeit only for the 
³ODVWILYHPLQXWHV´RIWKHQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\LQWRDQDEVWUDFWLGHDLQWHUPVRIZKLFKLWZDVDEVROXWHH[FOXVLYHZLWKLQ
its territory, excluding other, overlapping authorities, DQG WKHUHE\ DQ ³RQRII DIIDLU´ VHH 'DYLG .HQQHG\
³,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG WKH1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\+LVWRU\RIDQ ,OOXVLRQ´ Quinnipiac Law Review 17 (1997-1998): 
99-138. 
20
 Eric Beverley makes this point in relation to the state of Hyderabad. See Beverley, Hyderabad, British India, and 
the World, 54-72. 
21
 6WHSKHQ /HJJ ³$Q ,QWHUQDWLRQDO $QRPDO\" 6RYHUHLJQW\ WKH /HDJXH RI 1DWLRQV DQG ,QGLD¶V 3ULQFHO\
*HRJUDSKLHV´Journal of Historical Geography 43 (2014): 96-110. There were also questions about the position of 
the states within the broader constitutional scheme of India, particularly during the federation discussions of the 
V )RU D UHYLHZ RI WKH VWDQFHV RI WKH YDULRXV SDUWLHV LQ WKLV GHEDWH SDUWLFXODUO\ RQ WKH LVVXH RI WKH VWDWHV¶
sovereignty, see Andrew Muldoon, Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act (Farnham: Ashgate, 
 6DUDWK 3LOODL ³)UDJPHQWLQJ WKH 1DWLRQ 'LYLVLEOH 6RYHUHLJQW\ DQG 7UDYDQFRUH¶V 4XHVW IRU )HGHUDO
,QGHSHQGHQFH´ Law and History Review 34 (2016): 743-82; Rama SundDUL 0DQWHQD ³$QWLFRORQLDOLVP DQG
)HGHUDWLRQ LQ &RORQLDO ,QGLD´ Ab Imperio (2018): 36- .DYLWD 6DUDVZDWKL 'DWOD ³6RYHUHLJQW\ DQG WKH (QG RI
(PSLUH 7KH 7UDQVLWLRQ WR ,QGHSHQGHQFH LQ &RORQLDO +\GHUDEDG´ Ab Imperio (2018): 63-88; and Sunil 
Purushotham, ³)HGHUDWLQJ WKH 5DM +\GHUDEDG 6RYHUHLJQ .LQJVKLS DQG 3DUWLWLRQ´ Modern Asian Studies 
(forthcoming), https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X17000981 (accessed August 23, 2019). 
22
 Ian Copland, The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramountcy in Western India, 1857-1930 (Bombay: Orient 
Longman, 1982), 211-21; Copland, The Princes of India in the Endgame of Empire, 19-20; and Ramusack, The 
Indian Princes and their States, 92-97. 
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VXVSHQVLRQ RI ODZ´ 23  quasi-sovereign entities such as the princely states, therefore, were 
examples of ³DQRPDORXV OHJDOVSDFHVZKHUH LPSHULDO ODZDSSOLHGGLIIHUHQWO\± and sometimes 
QRW DW DOO´24  These views, however, capture only one side of the legal debates; WKH VWDWHV¶
responses to the endeavours of colonial officials, although sometimes alluded to, remain largely 
unmapped. Benton, for instance, touches on legal arguments made by the states but does not 
explore them in depth.25 Legal language, however, was a feature of arguments made by both the 
British and the princes in these jurisdictional conflicts.  
This all-round reliance on legal language was facilitated by the lack of a clear boundary 
EHWZHHQWKH³LPSHULDO´DQG³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´VSKHUHVLQODWHQLQHWHHQWK-century legal thought. The 
consequences of this fluidity were significant; I argue that it enabled a variety of interested 
players, including international lawyers, British politicians, colonial officials, rulers of princely 
states, and their advisors, to appropriate international legal language in different ways during the 
course of jurisdictional disputes. Specifically, these actors articulated differing versions of the 
idea of sovereignty to resolve questions of legal status, the extent of rights, and the proper 
exercise of powers, and also to construct a political order that was in line with their interests and 
DVSLUDWLRQV,QWKHSURFHVVRI³MRXVWLQJRYHU MXULVGLFWLRQ´26 therefore, both the princely states and 
WKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWFRQVLGHUHGWKHFRQFHSWRI³VRYHUHLJQW\´WREHWKHWRRODQGWKHWHUUDLQRI
legal and political struggle.27 So it is only by exploring both British and princely articulations of 
sovereignty that we can understand the work that international law and legal language performed 
in the colonial context. Examining this complex history is, I argue, critical to understanding the 
doubled nature of sovereignty and the stakes of international law itself.  
To trace these varied iterations of sovereignty, I examine legal texts authored by 
                                                 
23
 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 241.  
24
 %HQWRQ³)URP,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZWR,PSHULDO&RQVWLWXWLRQV´ 
25
 Benton, A Search for Sovereignty, 265.  
26
 7KLV LV LQVSLUHGE\/DXUHQ%HQWRQ¶VXVHRI WKH WHUP³MXULVGLFWLRQDO MRFNH\LQJ´6KHXVHV LW WRGHVFULEHERWK WKH
competition among colonial authorities to gain jurisdiction over disputes and the strategic use of institutional gaps 
by litigants in their own favour. See Benton, Law and Colonial Cultures, 2- , SUHIHU WR XVH ³MXULVGLFWLRQDO
MRXVWLQJ´LQRUGHUWRSURYLGHDFOHDUHUIRFXVRQWKHFRPSHWLWLRQDPRQJVWDWHDXWKRULWLHVLHWKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVDQG
the British Government) over jurisdiction rather than actions of forum shopping in which a number of low-level 
participants engaged in the imperial world. Mitra Sharafi also takes inspiration from Benton but prefers to use the 
WHUP³MXULVGLFWLRQDO MRVWOLQJ´ WRGHVFULEH IRUXPVKRSSLQJ LQRUGHU WRHPSKDVL]H ³WKHRIWHQFOXPV\QDWXUHRI WKHVH
PRYHV´DVLQKHUYLHZWKHWHUP³MRFNH\LQJ´LPSOLHV³DFHUWDLQDPRXQWRIVNLOO´6HH0LWUD6KDUDIL³7KH0DULWDO
3DWFKZRUNRI&RORQLDO6RXWK$VLD)RUXP6KRSSLQJIURP%ULWDLQWR%DURGD´Law and History Review 28 (2010): 
981.  
27
 , DP LQIOXHQFHG E\ ( 3 7KRPSVRQ¶V LGHD RI ODZ FRQVWLWXWLQJ D VLWH RI FRQIOLFW ZKHUH WKH DULVWRFUDF\ DQG WKH
plebians engaged in battles to redefine the nature of property rights. See E. P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The 
Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 261-69.  
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nineteenth-century British international lawyers and colonial officials as well as imperial legal 
practice, using the arguments made in two jurisdictional disputes between the princely states and 
the British Government as a fulcrum for analysis.28 By analysing colonial legal arguments and 
princely state responses, we can see that there were two opposing conceptions of sovereignty 
articulated in late nineteenth-century South Asia. British colonial officials, influenced by Henry 
0DLQH DUJXHG WKDW VRYHUHLJQW\ ZDV ³GLYLVLEOH´ ³IOH[LEOH´ DQG D ³TXHVWLRQ RI KLVWRULFDO IDFW.´ 
This understanding allowed the British to rely on the separate legal status of the princely states to 
maintain them DV³DOOLHV´LQWKHLPSHULDOSURMHFWZKLOHDOVRaffirming the right to intervene in the 
internal affairs of the states. However, on account of the capacity of sovereignty to be defined in 
two ways, the princely states were able to weigh in with their own contentions in response to 
British legal arguments. State representatives argued that sovereignty ZDV ³DEVROXWH´ DQG
³WHUULWRULDO´ in order to defend WKH VWDWHV¶ jurisdiction from British interference and also to 
consolidate control in the effort to construct powerful, centralized administrations; these 
endeavours were successful to a limited extent. Princes, their political advisors, and state 
bureaucrats, therefore, played a significant role in negotiating relations between the states and 
the British colonial power.  
By exploring British legal arguments and also bringing the voices of princely state 
representatives into the conversation on the relationship between sovereignty and empire, I hope 
to provide fresh perspectives on the role of international legal language in the colonial context 
and its continuing significance. International law, and the doctrine of sovereignty in particular, I 
argue, became the shared language for a variety of players in colonial South Asia to discuss 
political and social problems and to debate and resolve jurisdictional disputes; it was also a key 
forum for the negotiation of political power, and continues to remain as such.29  
This article is divided into five parts. First, I discuss the significance of sovereignty in 
                                                 
28
 In considering both legal treatises and imperial legal practice, I follow Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford who assert 
that international legal language was intricately linked to the everyday administration of the British Empire. See 
Benton and Ford, Rage for Order. For debates on the appropriate methodology for writing histories of international 
ODZSDUWLFXODUO\RQWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHEURDGHU³FRQWH[W´ZLWKLQZKLFKOHJDODUJXPHQWVZHUHPDGHLQWKHSDVWVHH
Anne Orford, ³2Q ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /HJDO 0HWKRG´ London Review of International Law 1 (2013): 166-97; Liliana 
2EUHJyQ7DUD]RQD³:ULWLQJ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HJDO+LVWRU\$Q2YHUYLHZ´ Monde(s) 7 (2015): 95-112; and Lauren 
%HQWRQ³%H\RQG$QDFKURQLVP+LVWRULHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZDQG*OREDO/HJDO3ROLWLFV´Journal of the History of 
International Law 21 (2019): 7-40.  
29
 I follow Rande Kostal in arguing that law was the language in which disputes over the exercise of political power 
were carried out across the British Empire. See R. W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power: Victorian Empire and the 
Rule of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
  8 
late nineteenth-century international law, tracing the different approaches taken by scholars in 
the period to the legal status of entities such as the princely states. In particular, I focus on the 
work of Henry Maine to WUDFHWKHWKHRUHWLFDOEDVLVRIWKHFRQFHSWLRQRI³GLYLVLEOH´VRYHUHLJQW\, 
which became the legal foundation of the turn in British imperial ideology towards working with 
local rulers rather than annexing territory. Then, I study the manner in which three colonial 
officials in the Political Department of the Government of India (Charles Aitchison, Charles 
Lewis Tupper, and William Lee-Warner) DGDSWHG 0DLQH¶V WKHRU\ RI GLYLVLEOH VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG
developed a system of precedent in order to expand British authority over the princely states. 
After analysing the British understanding of sovereignty, I move toward exploring the approach 
taken by the princely states in the next two sections of the article. Specifically, I review the 
princely state conception of ³territorial´ sovereignty by examining the legal arguments made by 
state officials in two jurisdictional disputes: the dispute between Travancore and the British 
Government over criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects and the dispute between 
Baroda and the British Government over jurisdiction over telegraph lines. In the conclusion, I 
reflect on the broader significance of these historical debates for understanding the role of 
sovereignty in the construction of global legal structures and for appreciating the continuing 
ramifications of the relationship between international law and empire.  
 
The Princely States, Sovereignty, and Late Nineteenth-Century International Law  
 'HILQLQJ WKH ³boundaries of the international´30 has always been a central concern of 
international law. Contemporary international lawyers, for instance, argue over the entities that 
FRQVWLWXWH WKH ³SURSHU´ VXEMHFWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ LQFOXGLQJ TXHVWLRQV VXFK DV ZKHWKHU
indigenous peoples are to be recognized as peoples entitled to self-determination. 31  Late 
nineteenth-century international lawyers were engaged in similar debates on the scope and limits 
RI ³WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO´ during a period when empire loomed large32 over the newly developing 
                                                 
30
 I borrow this term from Jennifer Pitts. See Pitts, Boundaries of the International. 
31
 See the discussions in Matthew Craven and RosH3DUILWW ³6WDWHKRRG6HOI-'HWHUPLQDWLRQ DQG5HFRJQLWLRQ´ LQ
International Law, 5th ed., ed. Malcolm D. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 177-226; and James 
Crawford, %URZQOLH¶V3ULQFLSOHVRI3XEOLF,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ, 9th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 105-
33. 
32
 For instance, John Westlake dedicated three of the eleven chapters of his international law textbook to colonial 
LVVXHV LQFOXGLQJ DQ HQWLUH FKDSWHU WR ³7KH (PSLUH RI ,QGLD´ 6HH -RKQ :HVWODNH Chapters on the Principles of 
International Law &DPEULGJH&DPEULGJH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV6FKRODUVKDYHQRWHGWKDW³WKH%ULWLVKUDUHO\ORVW
sight of the commanding ambitions of their Empire, which seemed particularly to condition their attitudes to any 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO MXULVWLF RUGHU´ 6HH :LOOLDP &RUQLVK ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ´ LQ The Oxford History of the Laws of 
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field of international law.33 More specifically, they sought to demarcate the frontiers of the 
spheres of national, imperial, and international law.  
The so-FDOOHG³VWDQGDUGRIFLYLOLzation,´34 which limited the applicability of international 
law to ³civilized,´ primarily European states, provided one solution. 35  For instance, John 
Westlake, one of the most influential British international lawyers of the time,36 argued that 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO VRFLHW\ ZDVJHRJUDSKLFDOO\ OLPLWHG WR(XURSHDQDQG$PHULFDQ VWDWHV DQG ³D IHw 
&KULVWLDQVWDWHV LQRWKHUSDUWVRI WKHZRUOG´37 7KLVZDVEHFDXVH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZZDV³VRFLDO´
DQGKDGWREH³ZHOODGDSWHGWRWKHFKDUDFWHUDQGFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKHPHQZKRDUHWRREVHUYH
LW´38 :HVWODNH¶V FRQWHPSRUDU\ the English lawyer William Edward Hall,39 also thought that 
international law was ³DSURGXFWRIWKHVSHFLDOFLYLOLVDWLRQRIPRGHUQ(XURSHDQGIRUPVDKLJKO\
artificial system of which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognised by 
countries differently civilised´40 This view was shared by Thomas Joseph Lawrence, a lawyer 
and clergyman41 who argued that international law was a body of rules that ³JUHZXSLQ&KULVWLDQ
Europe, though some of its roots may be traced back to ancient Greece and ancient Rome,´and 
then spread tR ³DOO FLYLOL]HG FRPPXQLWLHV RXWVLGH WKH (XURSHDQ ERXQGDULHV.´42 In the eyes of 
these scholarsLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZZDV³EDVHGRQWKHSRVVHVVLRQE\VWDWHVRIDFRPPRQDQGLQWKDW
                                                                                                                                                             
England, vol. 11, 1820-1914: English Legal System, ed. William Cornish, J. Stuart Anderson, Raymond Cocks et al 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 263.  
33
 The late nineteenth century is often seen as a formative period in the history of international law. For some, this is 
EHFDXVH RI WKH ³SURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQ´ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ WKURXJK WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI DVVRFLDWLRQV DQG FKDLUV DW
universities. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 
1870-1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11- DQG &DVSHU 6\OYHVW ³,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ LQ
Nineteenth-&HQWXU\%ULWDLQ´British Year Book of International Law 75 (2004): 9-70. For others, it is because of 
changes in doctrine rather than the structure of the profession. See Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making 
of International Law, 32-DQG&+$OH[DQGURZLF]³6RPH3UREOHPV LQ Whe History of the Law of Nations in 
$VLD´LQThe Law of Nations in Global History, ed. David Armitage and Jennifer Pitts (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2017), 79-80.  
34
 Gerrit Gong, 7KH6WDQGDUGRI³&LYLOL]DWLRQ´LQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLHW\ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).  
35
 7KHPRVWFRPSUHKHQVLYHDQDO\VLVRIWKHHIIHFWRIWKHLGHDRIWKH³VWDQGDUGRIFLYLOL]DWLRQ´RQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI
the doctrine of sovereignty in nineteenth-century international law is in Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law, 32-114.  
36
 Westlake was appointed Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge in 1888. See Nathan Wells, 
³:HVWODNH -RKQ -´ LQ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, online ed., ed. David Cannadine 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/36840 (accessed May 23, 2019). 
37
 Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, 81.  
38
 Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, 80.  
39
 7 ( +ROODQG ³+DOO :LOOLDP (GZDUG -´ UHY &DWKHULQH 3HDVH-Watkin, in Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/11997 (accessed May 23, 2019).  
40
 William Edward Hall, International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1880), 34.  
41
 $3HDUFH+LJJLQV³7KH/DWH'RFWRU7-/DZUHQFH´British Year Book of International Law 1 (1920-21): 233. 
42
 T. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law (Boston, MA: D. C. Heath & Co., 1895), 4-5, 26.  
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VHQVH DQ HTXDO FLYLOL]DWLRQ´43 2Q DFFRXQW RI WKH ³FLYLOL]HGXQFLYLOL]HG´ GLFKRWRP\ WKH\ GUHZ
relatively sharp distinctions between the international and imperial spheres. Westlake argued that 
WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH SULQFHO\ VWDWHV DQG WKH %ULWLVK *RYHUQPHQW KDG ³VKLIWHG IURP DQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO WR DQ LPSHULDO EDVLV´44 relegating the governance of princely states to imperial 
constitutional law. 45  Lawrence also claimed that WKH SULQFHO\ VWDWHV ZHUH ³QRW HYHQ SDUW-
VRYHUHLJQ´ DQG WKHUHE\ QRW VXEMHFWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´46 Hall shared this view, noting that 
HQWLWLHV VXFK DV WKH SULQFHO\ VWDWHV ³DUH RI FRXUVH QRW VXEMHFWV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ´47 These 
MXULVWV WKHQSURFHHGHG WRGHYLVH D VHULHVRI WHFKQLTXHV WR ³FLYLOL]H WKH uncivilized´ in order to 
bring non-European peoples into the realm of international law. The ideological basis of this 
approach was, as Antony Anghie argues, the idea of expanding European empires for the 
purpose of educating and improving the lives of the colonized peoples.48 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, justifications of imperial rule based 
on WKHLGHDRIWKH³FLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQ´were undergoing a broad critique in South Asia, largely on 
account of the events of 1857. This was the year in which almost the whole of northern India 
broke out in a widespread and violent revolt, the intensity of which left a deep impression on 
British administrators. There was broad participation in the revolt, which included a military 
mutiny, peasant uprisings, and rebellions led by deposed rulers and landlords. The British 
repressed the revolt after a long and violent siege and transferred control over territories in India 
from the English East India Company to the Crown. Karuna Mantena notes that prior to the 
rebellion ³OLEHUDO´ LPSHULDO DGPLQLVWUDWRUV LQVSLUHGE\ WKH³FLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQ´had engaged in 
GHHSO\ LQWHUYHQWLRQLVW PRGHV RI UXOH WR UDGLFDOO\ UHFRQVWUXFW ³QDWLYH VRFLHWLHV´49 This project 
included the annexation of princely states that, in the opinion of British administrators, had failed 
to SURYLGH³JRRGJRYHUQPHQW´WRWKHLUVXEMHFWV Allegations of misgovernment were brought to 
                                                 
43
 Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, 102-103.  
44
 Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law, 204.  
45
 /DXUHQ%HQWRQDUJXHV WKDW:HVWODNHFRQWLQXHG WR UHJDUG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZDVKDYLQJ ³WKHSRZHURIDQDORJ\´ LQ
UHODWLRQWRWKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVGHVSLWHUHOHJDWLQJWKHPWRWKH³LPSHULDO´ILHOG6HH%HQWRQA Search for Sovereignty, 
+RZHYHU:HVWODNH¶VFRntemporaries in South Asia were more circumspect of his views on the princely states 
and his advocacy of a constitutional tie between the states and the British Government; see, for instance, the 
discussion on William Lee-Warner below.  
46
 Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 68.  
47
 Hall, International Law, 23n2.  
48
 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 96.  
49
 Karuna Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the Ends of Liberal Imperialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 1-2.  
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justify the annexations of Jhansi and Awadh,50 both of which became centres of the uprising in 
1857. Consequently, later British administrators attributed the revolt tRWKH³(YDQJHOLFDO]HDORI
WKH OLEHUDOV´ 51  The second half of the nineteenth century was, therefore, dominated by an 
imperial ideology that focused on rule through local rulers, chiefs, and power brokers.52 The 
increasingly dominant view within the British establishment was that the rulers of the princely 
states ZHUH³WUDGLWLRQDO´RU³QDWXUDO´OHDGHUVZKRFRPPDQGHGWKHUHVSHFWOR\DOW\DQGREHGLHQFH
of the Indian masses who were immune to earlier projects of reform.53 However, the language of  
³JRRGJRYHUQPHQW´DQG³SURJUHVV´FRQWLQXHGWREHHPSOR\HGWRUDQNDQGUDWHWKHVHUXOHUV54 
This change in imperial ideology was facilitated by +HQU\0DLQH¶VQXDQFHGFULWLTXHRI
the liberal view of empire. Maine was a leading Victorian jurist; between 1862 and 1869 he was 
DOVR D SURPLQHQW PHPEHU RI %ULWDLQ¶V FRORQLDO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ LQ ,QGLD as Law Member in the 
Council of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India. On his return to England, he was 
appointed Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford; in 1871, he became a member of the 
6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH¶V&RXQFLORI,QGLDLQ/RQGRQ;55 in 1887, he was elected Whewell Professor of 
International Law at Cambridge.56  
As Karuna Mantena notes, Maine was a central figure in the late nineteenth-century 
reconfiguration of ideas about modernity and progress. He constructed a binary model: ancient 
societies were based around communities and fractured on contact with imperial rule by societies 
that had reached later stages of evolution and were focused on the individual. But rather than 
advocating the end of imperialism, he contended WKDWRQO\WKH%ULWLVK(PSLUH¶VGRPLQDQFHFRXOG
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 Ramusack, The Indian Princes and their States, 81-84. 
51
 Partha Chatterjee, The Black Hole of Empire: History of a Global Practice of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), 212. For further discussion of the causes and consequences of the revolt, see Thomas 
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(2015): 321-50.  
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 )LVKHU³'LSORPDF\LQ,QGLD´DQG0DQWHQDAlibis of Empire, 52.  
54
 Bhagavan, Sovereign Spheres, 3-4.  
55
 5 & - &RFNV ³0DLQH 6LU +HQU\ -DPHV 6XPQHU (1822-´ LQ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/17808 (accessed May 23, 2019). 
56
 Maine had considered standing for the Whewell professorship as early as 1867, with a view to having a settled 
position after his upcoming return to England from India. See George Feaver, From Status to Contract: A Biography 
of Sir Henry Maine 1822-1888 (London: Longmans, 1969), 109-10, 255-57.  
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prevent a further dissolution of ³traditional´ societies.57 To prevent further episodes of rebellion 
that would threaten the stability of the Empire, he DUJXHG LQ IDYRXU RI ³WKH SUHVHUYDWLRQ DQG
LQFRUSRUDWLRQRIQDWLYHLQVWLWXWLRQVLQWRLPSHULDOSRZHUVWUXFWXUHV´58 The princely states were the 
DUFKHW\SH RI VXFK ³QDWLYH´ LQVWLWXWLRQV Since maintaining alliances with entities such as the 
princely states necessitated their legal recognition in some form, it also required reinterpreting 
the concept of sovereignty and the nature of the boundary between imperial and international 
law, drawn so sharply by international law scholars like Westlake, Hall, and Lawrence. Key to 
this FKDQJHZDV0DLQH¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQof sovereignty as ³divisible.´59  
Maine first discussed the concept of sovereignty in an 1855 paper that he delivered before 
the Juridical Society. There he UHJUHWWHG WKH WHQGHQF\ RI ³WKH JUHDW PDMRULW\ RI FRQWHPSRUDU\
writers on International Law [to] tacitly assume that the doctrines of their system, founded on the 
principles of equity and common sense, were capable of being readily reasoned over in every 
stage of modern civilization´ZKHQ LQ IDFW WKHH[SODQDWLRQEHKLQG WKHGRFWULQHVZDV³HQWLUHO\
KLVWRULFDO´60 This historical approach contrasted with what he considered to be the abstract and 
ahistorical analytical school of jurisprudence, which was predominant in England at the time and 
was exemplified in the work of John Austin. In his view, $XVWLQ¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI ODZ DV ³WKH
FRPPDQG RI WKH VRYHUHLJQ´ SODFHG DQ overwhelming emphasis on the coercive power of a 
sovereign as the source of legal obligation. This position, he argued, was the outcome of 
DEVWUDFWLRQ ZKLFK QHJOHFWHG ³WKH HQWLUH PDVV RI LWV KLVWRULFDO DQWHFHGHQWV ZKLFK LQ HDFK
community determines how the Sovereign shall exercise or forbear from exercising his 
LUUHVLVWLEOH FRHUFLYH SRZHU´61 The result was that law, as defined by analytical jurisprudence, 
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was exclusively the product of coercive force and required the backing of a sanction.62 Maine 
argued instead that the link between coercive force and legal obligation was not a logically 
necessary one, but rather was the product of particular historical and social processes. He 
contended that sovereignty in Europe was linked to legislative activity on account of the 
influence of the Roman Empire, which had both legislated and levied taxes. The result of the 
Roman legacy was the modern social organization of Western Europe: highly centralized, 
actively legislating, territorially sovereign nation-states. 63  This position, however, was 
historically exceptional since other ancient empires had raised revenues and armies but had 
interfered only minimally in the civil and religious life of their subjects.64 Consequently, other 
empires had not developed along the lines of centralized Western European states. Maine even 
doubted the status of the United StatHV ZLWK LWV ³VHPL-VRYHUHLJQ´ FRQVWLWXHQW VWDWHV DQG WKH
German Confederation.65 
Relying on the claim of a radical difference between ³WUDGLWLRQDO´ VRFLHWLHV that were 
based around local communities (rather than a distant ruler) DQG³PRGHUQ´FHQWUDOL]HG:HVWHUQ
European states, Maine UHMHFWHG WKH DQDO\WLFDO VFKRRO¶V LQVLVWHQFH RQ WKH LQGLYLVLELOLW\ RI
VRYHUHLJQW\,QVWHDGKHFRQWHQGHGWKDW³>W@KHSRZHUVRIVRYHUHLJQVDUHDEXQGOHRUFROOHFWLRQRI
powers, and they may be separateG RQH IURP DQRWKHU´66  Maine sharpened this idea of the 
³GLYLVLELOLW\´ RI VRYHUHLJQW\ in the context of theorizing the relationship between the princely 
states and the British Government.  
In 1864, Maine wrote what was to become a tremendously influential minute on the 
sovereignty of Kathiawar, the collective name for a number of small princely states in the 
peninsular region of western India.67 Before the arrival of the British, the rulers of the Kathiawar 
states had recognized the supremacy of a succession of overlords, including the sultans of Delhi, 
the Mughals, and the Marathas, through the payment of tribute. In 1820, after a series of 
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agreements, the East India Company obtained the right of tribute over the region.68 In the 1830s, 
the Company increasingly intervened in Kathiawar affairs; for instance, it took over criminal 
jurisdiction in the states. Despite this, on several occasions Company officials stated clearly that 
Kathiawar was not part of British territory, indicating their recognition of the separate legal 
status of the princely states.69 
A rather innocuous attempt to transfer jurisdiction over the state of Bhavnagar from 
Ahmedabad authorities (in British India) to the Kathiawar Political Agent (a British 
representative in princely state territory) VHWWKHVWDJHIRU0DLQH¶VPLQXWH.70 This process ran into 
trouble when the Finance Department of the Government of India questioned whether Kathiawar 
was part of British territory. If Kathiawar was foreign territory, then the proposed transfer could 
not be done by legislation. It would require a properly ratified treaty of cession since the change 
would not merely reorganize territory, but transfer it to a foreign sovereign.71  
 The members of the Council of the Government of Bombay, a province in British India, 
unanimously decided that Kathiawar was British territory,72 with the Governor, Henry Bartle 
Frere, contending that the Kathiawar UXOHUV¶minimal rights, such as jurisdiction over their own 
subjects, could not be called rights of sovereignty. 73  Henry Mortimer Durand, the Foreign 
Secretary of the Government of India, agreed with the Bombay Council, arguing that the 
Kathiawar rulers had the status of dependents. He dismissed the (DVW ,QGLD&RPSDQ\¶Vearlier 
declaration of Kathiawar as foreign territory, arguing that it had been a confidential expression of 
views, and not a formal and publicly promulgated renunciation of British sovereign rights.74 The 
matter was referred to the Council of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, of which 
Maine was the Law Member.  
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 In his minute, Maine GHILQHG VRYHUHLJQW\ DV ³D WHUP ZKLFK LQ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ
indicates a well ascertained assemblage of separate powers or privileges. The rights which form 
part of the aggregate are specifically named by publicists, who distinguish them as the right to 
make war and peace, the right to administer civil and criminal justice, the right to legislate, and 
so forth. A sovereign who possesses the whole of this aggregate of rights is called an 
independent sovereign, but there is not, nor has there ever been, anything in International Law to 
prevent some of these rights being lodged with one possessor and some with another. 
6RYHUHLJQW\ KDV DOZD\V EHHQ UHJDUGHG DV GLYLVLEOH´ He went on to note, ³³sovereignty´ LV
divisible, EXW ³independence´ LV not.´ In his view, the British Government was the only 
independent sovereign in India, but there also existed numerous other sovereigns, i.e. the 
princely states, which were not independent.75  
 Maine also argued that sovereignty, for the purposes of international law, was a ³question 
of fact´ that had to be separately decided in each case and to which ³no general rules´ applied. 
Treaties often contained the manner in which sovereign rights were to be divided, but when there 
were no written documents or when the documents were ambiguous, jurists could determine this 
distribution from the de facto relations of the states with the British Government. Maine 
proceeded to conduct a factual analysis of the situation and concluded that the principal right the 
Kathiawar states enjoyed was immunity from foreign laws; other rights included the exercise of 
limited civil and criminal jurisdiction and the right to coin money. He, therefore, approved of 
British interference for the improvement in administration so long as it did not disturb the 
unqualified immunity of the states from foreign laws. However, he also admitted that the 
Kathiawar states enjoyed some limited degree of sovereignty, and hence were foreign territory, 
so LQWHUQDWLRQDOUXOHVDQGFRQFHSWLRQVDSSOLHGWRWKHP³LQVRPHVHQVH´76  
 Another Council member, H. B. Harington, agreed, and quoted the work of the American 
international lawyer Henry Wheaton to argue that the exercise of some rights by the British did 
not mean that the Kathiawar chiefs had lost all their rights of sovereignty. Like Maine, however, 
he argued that this did not prevent the British, as the ³paramount power,´ from intervening to 
improve the peace.77 The Viceroy, John Lawrence, also expressed his support for the divided 
nature of Kathiawar sovereignty, contending WKDW³DOWKRXJK.DWW\ZDULV%ULWLVK7HUULWRU\LQWKH
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sense that its Chiefs and people owe allegiance to the sovereignty of the British Crown, yet it is 
not British Territory in the sense of its being subject to British Laws, Regulations, and 
Administration;´ hence, British laws could not be extended to the region.78  
 0DLQH¶V views received a stamp of approval when the Secretary of State for India, 
Charles Wood, recognizHGWKH³PRGLILHGIRUPRIVRYHUHLJQW\´of the region. Wood argued that 
although the British Government had intervened in Kathiawar for the maintenance of order, it 
had never imposed British laws since official policy was not aimed at undermining the authority 
and independence of local chiefs, but rather to work through the agency of these rulers.79 
 7KH.DWKLDZDUPLQXWHH[HPSOLILHG0DLQH¶VKLVWRULFDODSSURDFKWROHJDOFRQFHSWVVXFKDV
sovereignty, with the idea that the princely states possessed only certain sovereign rights (the 
remainder being exercised by the British Government) fitting within his broader understanding 
RI³QDWLYH´VRFLHWLHVas UDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQWIURP³PRGHUQ´FHQWUDOL]HG(XURSHDQQDWLRQ-states. By 
arguing that sovereignty was divisible, and thereby that the Kathiawar rulers were both sovereign 
and not sovereign, Maine softened the boundary between imperial and international law and 
advocated WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZWRWKHVWDWHV³LQVRPHVHQVH,´for instance, in the 
case of treaty interpretation or sovereign immunity, but not in others.80 /LNH0DLQH¶VWKRXJKWLQ
general, this conceptualization of the fuzzy frontiers of national, imperial, and international law 
enabled the British to entrench their paramountcy in South Asia by providing the legal basis of 
the post-1857 imperial ideology of the recognition of the princely states and their simultaneous 
incorporation into the broader imperial hierarchy.81 Consequently, the British abandoned their 
earlier policy of princely state annexation, and replaced it with a strategy of providing support to 
WKHSULQFHVWRPDLQWDLQWKHPDV³MXQLRUDOOLHV´LQWKHLPSHULDOSURMHFW 0DLQH¶Vapproach proved 
to be an inspiration for the Political Department of the Government of India, influencing 
successive generations of British political officers in the late nineteenth century.82 In the next 
                                                 
78
 Minute by the Viceroy and Governor-General and President of the Council of India, 23 February 1864, 
IOR/L/PS/6/532.  
79
 Despatch of the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India, no. 79, 16 December 1864, 
IOR/L/PS/6/597. 
80
 Lauren Benton, however, argues that Maine distanced the princely states from international law. See Benton, A 
Search for Sovereignty, 249.  
81
 $V-HQQLIHU3LWWVQRWHVWKH³LQFOXVLRQ´RIFHUWDLQHQWLWLHVLQWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\RQXQHTXDOWHUPVZDV
often the basis for the dispossession and subjugation of indigenous peoples. See Pitts, Boundaries of the 
International, 8-10.  
82
 0DLQH¶V influence is unsurprising as his texts were required reading for members of the Indian Civil Service. See 
Mantena, Alibis of Empire, 155.   
  17 
section, I will examine the many ways in which these political officials interpreted Maine and 
drew on his ideas to develop a coherent approach to understanding the relationship between the 
princely states and the British Government.  
 
Divisible Sovereignty and the Indian Political Department  
 The British handled their relations with the princely states through the Political 
Department of the Government of India,83 whose officials were recruited from both the Indian 
army and the Indian Civil Service.84 Although the department came under the Government of 
India, it was different from the other government departments. Unlike the secretaries of the 
RWKHUVZKRUHSRUWHGWR0HPEHUVRIWKH9LFHUR\¶V&RXQFLOWhe most senior civil servant of this 
department, the Political Secretary (at times also known as the Foreign Secretary), reported 
directly to the Viceroy, who was the representative of the British Crown in India.85 Political 
officers were located at the 3ROLWLFDO'HSDUWPHQW¶Voffices in the British Indian capital, Calcutta, 
at provincial capitals like Bombay or Madras, or at the courts of individual states, where they 
were known variously as residents, political agents, or agents to the Governor-General. Although 
political officers were representatives of the British Crown, Barbara Ramusack has convincingly 
DUJXHG WKDW WKH\ ZHUH ³MDQXV-IDFHG IXQFWLRQDULHV´ because they formulated and implemented 
British policy as well as represented the views of the princes to the British Government. These 
GXDO IXQFWLRQV ³VSDZQHG FRQWLQXDO GLVDJUHHPHQts within the British hierarchy´ 86  that are 
particularly visible in jurisdictional disputes between the princely states and the British 
Government.    
 Around seventy percent of serving political officers had an army background. Although 
Ian Copland claims that the preference for military men meant that the Political Department 
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³EHFDPHDE\ZRUGIRULQWHOOHFWXDOPHGLRFULW\´87 the most influential members of the department 
were civil servants who had passed competitive examinations for their place.88 Political officers 
did not have any special administrative or diplomatic training and relied largely on learning 
through experience. 89  Internal Political Department texts and manuals, therefore, became 
particularly significant in guiding officials in their work. Consequently, understanding the 
nuances of these texts is crucial for analysing the British colonial view of princely state 
sovereignty and the nature of the relationship between the states and the British Government.90  
One of the first of the Political Department treatises was an 1875 tract titled The Native 
States of India,91 written by Charles Aitchison, a political officer who spent much of his career in 
Punjab and rose to become the Foreign Secretary of the Government of India .92 Although he did 
QRWVSHFLILFDOO\DFNQRZOHGJH0DLQH¶V.DWKLDZDUPLQXWHKH, did, however cite Ancient Law93), 
Aitchison emphasized the divisibility of sovereignty by arguing WKDW VRYHUHLJQW\ ZDV ³DQ
assemblage of powers or attributes which may either be all concentrated in one possessor or 
VKDUHGZLWKDQRWKHU´94 With respect to the princely states, he noted that sovereignty was shared 
between the British Government and the princes in varying degrees. 95  The princely states 
enjoyed sovereign SRZHU ³PRUH RU OHVV LPSHUIHFW,´ but did not possess ³international life.´96 
Although Aitchison argued that international law did not apply to the relations between the 
British Government and the princely states, he noted that it could be a useful guide for the 
settlement of disputes to the extent that it ZDV³DQHPERGLPHQWRISULQFLSOHVRIQDWXUDOHTXLW\RU
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of usages which independent nations have found it convenient or for their common advantage to 
agree upon regulating their intercourse with each other.´97  
$LWFKLVRQ¶Venduring contribution to the Political Department, however, did not lie in the 
treatise, but rather in his work on the compilation of treaties between the princely states and the 
British Government.98 He built on the idea that he first developed in his monograph, where he 
had outlined general principles drawn from a series of disputes between the states and the British 
Government; these principles, he argued, sustained British relations with the states. This was the 
first indication of the development of precedent to define the relationship. In the compilation, 
Aitchison listed the treaties state-wise, and prefaced each one with a detailed historical 
narrative, 99  arguing that the treaties had to be interpreted based on the evolution of the 
relationship between the states and the British Government.100 $LWFKLVRQ¶V VXFFHVVRUV LQ WKH
Political Department built upon this insight to argue WKDW³GHFLVLRQV´LQODWHU³FDVHV´RUGLVSXWHV
could be used to override specific provisions in the treaties, most often at the expense of the 
states.   
One of these successors was Charles Lewis Tupper, also a man who spent much of his 
official life in Punjab.101 Tupper freely admitted his intellectual debt to Maine, noting ³KLV
pregnant suggestions have constantly guided my work in India, and throughout my life have 
FKLHIO\ LQVSLUHG P\ VWXGLHV´ 102  In 1893, Tupper published an unofficial text, Our Indian 
Protectorate,103 LQZKLFKKHSURYLGHGDQRXWOLQHRI³,QGLDQSROLWLFDOODZ´DWHrm he used to refer 
to the law that governed the relationship between the princely states and the British 
Government.104 For Tupper, one of the basic principles underlying Indian political law was the 
divisibility of sovereignty; he quoted extensively from MDLQH¶V.DWKLawar minute to support this 
contention. He GHVFULEHGWKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVDV³DXWRQRPRXVVWDWHVHQMR\LQJYDULRXVGHJUHHVRI
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sovereignty, levying their own taxes, administering their own laws, and possessing territory 
which is, for purposes of internal administration, foreign territory, and has not been annexed to 
WKHGRPLQLRQVRIWKH%ULWLVK&URZQ´105 The states, however, did not have the right to external 
relations and were politically subordinate to the British Government, and so, could not be 
subjects of international law.106 Despite this assertion, Tupper, like Aitchison, did not entirely 
dismiss the application of international law to the princely states.107 The states had immunity 
from foreign law, the British Government concluded treaties with the states, and questions arose 
relating to boundary disputes, extra-territorial jurisdiction, and the extradition of offenders. In all 
these cases, Tupper argued that international law could be used to resolve the issue.108 
7XSSHU¶V views proved to be influential and the Government of India invited him to 
update Leading Cases, a textbook on Indian political practice written by Mortimer Durand.109 
7KHUHVXOWZDV7XSSHU¶Vfour-volume Indian Political Practice,110 a survey of major cases from 
which he drew the main principles governing the relationship between the British Government 
and the princely states. The treatise became a reference manual for the Political Department, and 
was kept confidential.111 Tupper included treaties with the princely states, provisions in British 
Indian statutes, and court decisions as sources of the principles, but noted that the most important 
source was the actual practice of the British Government in its dealings with the states ± what he 
GXEEHG³XVDJH´112 Tupper essentially produced a manual of case law to guide political officers 
in their work in relation to the princely states. The emphasis, building on $LWFKLVRQ¶VZRUNZDV
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on historical practice in order to determine the manner in which sovereign rights were divided 
between the princely states and the British Government.113 Tupper¶V ZRUN GHYHORSHG WKH LGHD
that principles developed in the case of a single state were applicable in relation to all states; 
unsurprisingly, then, ³XVDJH´ IRUPHG WKH EDVLV RI %ULWLVK FODLPV RI PRUH H[WHQVLYH VRYHUHLJQ
powers, thereby strengthening British authority over the states. 
The final architect of the legal understanding of the relations between the states and the 
British Government was William Lee-Warner, who was largely based in the Bombay Presidency 
through his career, and was 7XSSHU¶V FRPSHWLWRU LQ ³WKH UHDOP RI LGHDV DQG IRU RIILFLDO
favour.´114 Lee-Warner also cited Maine to argue that sovereignty was divisible; in the case of 
the princely states, the distribution of sovereign powers was a question of fact to be determined 
by the evidence of treaties or usage. Of the two, he emphasized the role of usage; like Tupper, he 
argued that practice in relation to some states could constitute a precedent that was applicable 
against other states as well.115 He first tried to promote his views in an 1886 manuscript titled 
Elementary Treatise on the Conduct of Political Relations with Native States; however, the 
Government of India chose Tupper over him to compile a textbook on political practice.116 In 
1894, therefore, Lee-Warner published the work as a private individual, under the title Protected 
Princes of India, a revised version of which appeared in 1910 as The Native States of India.117 
In comparison with Tupper and Aitchison, Lee-Warner was a much stronger proponent of 
the international status of the princely states.118 He relied on the idea of divisible sovereignty to 
argue that the princely states were semi-sovereign since they possessed some (though not all) 
powers of a sovereign. He admitted that the tie between the princely states and the British 
*RYHUQPHQW ZDV QRW ³VWULFWO\´ LQWHUQDWLRQDO VLQFH WKH VWDWHV ZHUH QRW HTXDO SRZHUV DQG KDG
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restrictions placed on both external relations and internal government.119 Despite this, he argued 
WKDWLWZDVSRVVLEOHWRFRQFHLYHRIDVRYHUHLJQW\WKDW³DOWKRXJKZDQWLQJLQFRPSOHWHQHVVLQHYHU\
UHVSHFW ZDV D VXUH GHIHQFH DJDLQVW DQQH[DWLRQ´ 120  Combined with the argument that 
iQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ UHJXODWHG WR D OLPLWHGH[WHQW WKH UHODWLRQVRI ³FRPPXQLWLHVRI DQ DQDORJRXV
FKDUDFWHUZLWK LQGHSHQGHQW VWDWHV´/HH-Warner argued that the princely states could claim the 
shelter of international law.121  
 Lee-Warner specifically criticizHG-RKQ:HVWODNH IRUEHLQJ³WKHVWURQJHVWDGYRFDWH´RI
the argument in favour of a constitutional tie between the princely states and the British 
Government.122 Westlake noted that the states ³KDGQRLQWHUQDWLRQDOH[LVWHQFH´as foreign states 
could not engage with them without the acquiescence of the British Government.123 Hence, he 
argued that the ties between the states and the British Government could only be 
³constitutional.´124 Lee-:DUQHUKRZHYHUUHOLHGRQ0DLQH¶V.DWKLDZDUPLQXWHWRDUJXHWKDWWKH
loss of one facet of sovereignty, i.e. the right to external relations, did not destroy the 
international status of the princely states.125 +HQRWHGWKDWHYHQ³LIZHRIILFLDOO\DYRLGVSHDNLQJ
of [states] as sovereigns we constantly apply to them conceptions of sovereignty, and are guided 
LQPDQ\RXUQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKHPE\WKHVSLULWRUWKHFRQFHSWLRQVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ´126 He 
pointed out that the British Parliament had accepted princely stateV¶ treaties as binding, while 
British courts had consistently treated the treaties as international obligations, with international 
law principles being used for their interpretation. He also described situations where the princely 
states were not treated as a constitutional part of British India: for instance, the exclusion of 
princely states from obligations under commercial treaties and from British Indian law.127  
For Lee-Warner, the break in the constitutional tie signified that international law could 
be the only law applicable to the relationship, even if the states lacked complete independence or 
even internal autonomy. Instead, the crucial tests were, first, ZKHWKHU WKHUH ZDV ³FRPPRQ
subjection to a common legislature, capable of making municipal laws binding upon the 
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FRQVHQWLQJ VWDWHV DQG WKHLU VXEMHFWV´ DQG secondly, WKH H[LVWHQFH RI ³D FRQIOLFW RI ULJKWV DQG
interests which the states concerned could not in the absence of international law settle otherwise 
than by DSSHDO WR IRUFH´128 The lack of a common legislature for British India, the princely 
states, and other parts of the British Empire, together with the existence of disputes led him to 
argue that peaceful adjustment was needed by legal methods, leaving the field open for 
international law.129  
 Lee-Warner argued that Maine himself had envisaged such a view. In his Kathiawar 
minute, Maine had relied on the assumption that international law DSSOLHG³LQVRPHVHQVH´WRWKH
case in order to argue that the British Government was bound, with regard to international rules, 
by its earlier disclaimer of sovereignty over Kathiawar. If international rules were applied, then 
rulers of princely states would be entitled, Lee-Warner argued, WR³WKHUHVSHFWDQGLQGHSHQGHQFH
ZKLFK WKH LGHD RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ VR SRZHUIXOO\ VHFXUHV´130 Since the states were foreign 
territory, if the British Government wished to obtain an attribute of sovereignty within the realm 
of the state, such as railway jurisdiction, then it had to obtain a concession from the state; it could 
not simply use the constitutional mechanism of enacting a law to obtain the jurisdiction.131  
 A review of the writings of Aitchison, Tupper, and Lee-Warner reveals the two basic 
principles that guided British political officers in late nineteenth-century South Asia. The first 
ZDV WKH LGHDRI³GLYLVLEOHVRYHUHLJQW\´developed through +HQU\0DLQH¶Vpowerful influence. 
So sovereign powers were divided between the princely states and the British Government; as a 
result, the states were both sovereign and not so, blurring the boundary between imperial and 
international law. Maine and his cohort in the Political Department all thought that international 
law had some part to play in defining the relationship between the states and the British 
Government, although each of them had a different answer as to the precise nature of this role. 
Since boundaries between imperial and international law were hazy, colonial bureaucrats were 
able to argue in favour of extensive British extra-territorial jurisdiction, while also maintaining 
WKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVDV³DOOLHV´ 
Interlinked with the first principle of divisible sovereignty was the second, the idea of 
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³SUHFHGHQW´132  Since colonial officials agreed that sovereign powers were divided among a 
number of entities, they were also concerned with the question of how such powers were 
distributed. Instead of deducing answers from an abstract idea of sovereignty, they relied heavily 
on history and political practice. This led to the development of precedent in the context of 
princely state relations, exemplified in the reliance on manuals of case law like Indian Political 
Practice, and the official claim that general principles drawn from cases in relation to one state 
could be applied in similar cases in other states. Much like the concept of divisible sovereignty, 
the idea of political precedent enabled the British to entrench their paramountcy by expanding 
their own sovereign powers at the expense of the princely states through the mechanism of 
relying on case law to override specific provisions in British treaties with the states.   
The twin principles RI ³GLYLVLEOH VRYHUHLJQW\´ DQG ³SUHFHGHQW´ formed the core legal 
repercussions of the shift in British imperial ideology in the aftermath of the turmoil of 1857. 
Inspired by Henry 0DLQH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIUDGLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ³WUDGLWLRQDO´$VLDQDQG
³PRGHUQ´(XURSHDQVRFLHWLHVWKLVQHZSKLORVRSK\RIFRORQLDOLVPrelied on the incorporation of 
local rulers into the imperial hierarchy to provide stability to colonial rule after a period of 
rebellion. As a result, HQWLWLHV VXFK DV WKH SULQFHO\ VWDWHV ZHUH UHFRJQL]HG DV ³VRPHZKDW´
sovereign junior allies albeit within the broader enterprise of entrenching British paramountcy.  
The softening of the boundaries between the imperial and the international, however, also 
had other consequences. Specifically, it led to the saturation of the South Asian landscape with 
the language of international law, and sovereignty in particular. In addition to British officials, 
princely state representatives also appropriated international legal language to argue about the 
legal status and sovereign powers of the states. Colonial civil servants considered jurisdiction to 
be one of the powers exercised by a sovereign; since sovereign powers were divided between the 
British Government and the princely states, they argued that the British Government exercised 
some jurisdiction within a state, while the remainder was with the state itself. Therefore, disputes 
over jurisdiction were rife, and the states and the British Government continually argued over the 
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appropriate manner in which jurisdictional powers were divided.133 The princely states had their 
own conceptions of sovereignty that they articulated in these disputes, at times with some 
success. It is critical to examine these arguments to understand the different ways in which 
sovereignty was defined as well as the stakes of international law in the colonial context. In the 
next two sections, therefore, I examine two such conflicts: the first was a dispute between 
Travancore and the British Government over jurisdiction over European British subjects who 
committed crimes within the territory of princely states, and the second was a dispute between 
Baroda and the British Government over jurisdiction over telegraph lines within state territory.  
 
Travancore and Jurisdiction over European British Subjects   
 In the second half of the nineteenth century, the British Government began to claim 
jurisdiction over its subjects who resided in the princely states.134 The states resisted these claims 
as they considered British extraterritorial jurisdiction to be highly intrusive. A case in point was 
the long-running dispute between Travancore and the British Government over jurisdiction over 
European British subjects135 who committed crimes in Travancore territory.136  
 The dispute was triggered in September 1868 by John Liddell¶Vpetition to the Governor 
of Madras, a province in British India, seeking relief from an alleged unlawful detention by the 
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authorities of the state of Travancore.137 Liddell had been convicted of theft by a Travancore 
court,138 but claimed that as a European British subject, he was subject only to the jurisdiction of 
British Indian courts. He argued, therefore, that his trial and subsequent conviction had been 
illegal.139  To support his claim, he adduced the Governor-General¶V proclamation (dated 10 
January 1867) that provided:  
« 7KH *RYHUQRU-General in Council is « pleased to declare « that original 
criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects of Her Majesty being 
Christians residing in the Native States and Chiefships below named, shall «be 
exercised by, and distributed among, the several High Courts «as follows:  
« 
By the High Court of Madras in Mysore, Travancore, and Cochin.140   
The Advocate-General of the Madras Government RSLQHG WKDW/LGGHOO¶V WULDOZDV LOOHJDO, 
arguing WKDW³>W@KHFULPLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHU(XURSHDQ%ULWLVKVXEMHFWVKLWKHUWRH[HUFLVHGE\WKH
Travancore Courts does not appear to rest upon any treaty, but to have been ceded by courtesy 
and comity,´and that it had ended with the 1867 proclamation that conferred such jurisdiction on 
the Madras High Court.141 The Madras Government, therefore, asked 7UDYDQFRUH IRU /LGGHOO¶V
release.142  
In response, T. Madhava Rao,143 the diwan (chief minister) of Travancore, launched a 
VWURQJGHIHQFHRI7UDYDQFRUH¶VH[HUFLVHRIFULPLQDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHU(XURSHDQ%ULWLVKVXEMHFWV
He cited from international law treatises by Henry Wheaton and Emer de Vattel to argue that 
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MXULVGLFWLRQ ZDV ³an inherent right of sovereignty,´144 and that ³WKH MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH QDWLRQ
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. «All exceptions, therefore, to the 
full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of 
WKH QDWLRQ LWVHOI´145 He also noted that Travancore had not agreed to cede jurisdiction over 
European British subjects; in fact, on several previous occasions, the British Government had 
recognizHG7UDYDQFRUH¶V ULJKW WR WU\(XURSHDQV UHVLGLQJ LQ LWV WHUULWRU\ Finally, he argued that 
the 1867 proclamation, being British Indian municipal law, could not affect the inherent rights of 
foreign states, which were subjects of international law.146 For Madhava Rao, sovereign powers 
were linked with the control of territory, and jurisdiction was a right exercised by the territorial 
sovereign, in this case, the maharaja of Travancore.  
Travancore also sought additional support to buttress its case, taking the opinion of J. D. 
Mayne, a well-respected member of the Madras bar and former Advocate-General of the Madras 
Government.147 Mayne first discussed the situation in the Ottoman Empire and China, both of 
which had entered into treaties for the cession of jurisdiction over foreigners. In comparison, 
QRQH RI 7UDYDQFRUH¶V WUHDWLHV FRQWHPSODWHG VXFK D UHQXQFLDWLRQ. And in support of Madhava 
Rao, Mayne also insisted WKDW WKH *RYHUQPHQW RI ,QGLD¶V  SURFODPDWLRQ would be 
inoperative against TravancRUHVLQFH³3DUOLDPHQWLVDVLQFDSDEOHRIWDNLQJDZD\WKHSRZHUVRID
FRXUWLQ7UDYDQFRUHDVLWLVRIGHDOLQJZLWKWKHFRXUWVRI)UDQFH´148 
 On the strength of these arguments, a majority of the members of the Council of the 
Government of Madras agreed with Travancore¶VFODLP. The dissenter, H. D. Phillips, claimed 
that the British Government was bound by the 1867 proclamation and denied that Travancore 
could claim the privileges of international law since it was a ³feudatory´ state.149 However, the 
Governor of Madras, Francis Napier, conceded that no treaty was necessary to confer jurisdiction 
RQ7UDYDQFRUHDVLWZDV³DULJKWZKLFKLVLQKHUHQWLQIUHHDQGDEVROXWHVRYHUHLJQW\´He denied 
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that Travancore had the right to appeal to international law, which regulated the relations of 
independent and equal European states, since the position of the British as the ³paramount 
power´ deprived the princely states of some of their sovereign rights. In this specific case, 
however, he argued that it was inappropriate to deny Travancore the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction. 150  A. J. Arbuthnot, the final member of the Council, agreed with Napier and 
emphasized WKHQHHGIRUDVWDWH¶VH[SOLFLWFRQVHQWIRU the cession of jurisdiction.151 As a result, 
the Government of Madras revoked its previous resolution VHHNLQJ/LGGHOO¶VUHOHDVH152 
 When the Government of India intervened in the situation, the Law Member, Henry 
Maine, DGPLWWHGWKDW7UDYDQFRUH³WKHRUHWLFDOO\´had jurisdiction to try European British subjects 
for offences committed within its boundaries since it was not a part of British India. He also 
agreed with J. D. Mayne that the 1867 notification FRXOGQRW WDNHDZD\7UDYDQFRUH¶V LQKHUHQW
jurisdiction, any more than English statutes could take away the rights of France or Prussia to try 
British subjects committing offences in their territories. Being politically astute, however, he 
DUJXHG WKDW ZLWKRXW GHQ\LQJ 7UDYDQFRUH¶V DEVWUDFW ULJKW WR WU\ (XURSHDQ British subjects, the 
British Government ought to point out that there were reasons for Europeans to be committed to 
Madras for trial, including the importance of trying them by a procedure to which they were 
accustomed and the problems of native prisons.153 7KLVZDV DSUDFWLFDO DSSOLFDWLRQRI0DLQH¶V
enunciation of divisible sovereignty; here he argued that the British could exercise jurisdiction 
over some persons within princely state territory while the state would retain the jurisdiction over 
everyone else.  
 In August 1871, the Government of India ODLG GRZQ D FDWHJRULFDO UXOH VWDWLQJ ³1R
Native State can be allowed to try a European British subject according to its own forms of 
SURFHGXUHDQGSXQLVKKLPDFFRUGLQJWRLWVRZQODZV´It admitted that in theory, every state that 
had independent internal administration had the right to deal with persons resident within its 
jurisdiction according to its own laws. However, it claimed that there was a universal exception 
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to this ± H[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\ZKLFKKDGEHHQDSSOLHGE\&KULVWLDQVWDWHVLQ0XVOLPDQG³KHDWKHQ´
FRXQWULHV³RXWRIQHFHVVLW\´RQDFFRXQWRIWKHGLIIHUHQFHVLQ³UHOLJLRQHGXFDWLRQVRFLDOKDELWV
ODZVDQGMXGLFLDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´Underlining the role of historical facts in determining the division 
of powers, the Government of India also built upon earlier claims relating to extradition, 
asserting that the British had never surrendered European British subjects for trial by princely 
state courts. Since full reciprocity between the British and the princely states had never been 
accepted practice in the past, the Government of India argued the princely states could not be 
permitted to try European British subjects apprehended in princely state territory; instead, they 
were to be tried by Justices of the Peace appointed by the British Government, and committed to 
courts in British India.154  
After the 1871 resolution, the Government of India passed the Foreign Jurisdiction and 
Extradition Act, 1872, which provided for the appointment of Justices of the Peace in the 
princely states to commit European British subjects to trial and barred the extradition of 
European British subjects to the states. The Act did not, however, explicitly provide that princely 
states could not try European British subjects. The Government of India then issued a 
notification delegating jurisdiction over European British subjects in Travancore to the Resident, 
appointed the Resident as a Justice of the Peace, and directed that the Resident commit European 
British subjects to the Madras High Court for trial.155  
 Travancore lodged a protest, with A. Sashiah Shastri,156 Madhava Rao¶V VXFFHVVRU as 
diwan, referring WR KLV SUHGHFHVVRU¶V DUJXPHQWV LQ WKH /LGGHOO FDVH +e questioned the 
notification since it related to European British subjects, but not to other Europeans or 
Americans or the subjects of Indian or Asian sovereigns.157 Surprisingly, the British Resident at 
Travancore supported Sashiah Shastri; he contended that European British subjects had 
voluntarily chosen to settle under the sovereignty of a princely state and that Residency records 
did not show any complaints against the exercise of jurisdiction by state authorities. He proposed 
a compromise: Christian judges in Travancore courts, who could be arranged to be European 
                                                 
154
 Resolution of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Judicial, no. 158J, 8 August 1871, IOR/P/748, 
Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Judicial, August 1871, no. 24.  
155
 Notification of the Government of India, Foreign Department, no. 8J, 9 January 1874, IOR/P/752, Proceedings of 
the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Judicial, January 1874, no. 12.   
156
 )RU D GHVFULSWLRQ RI 6DVKLDK 6KDVWUL¶V OLIH VHH % 9 .DPHVYDUD $L\DU Sir A. Sashiah Shastri, An Indian 
Statesman: A Biographical Sketch (Madras: Srinivasa, Varadachari & Co., 1902). 
157
 Letter from the diwan of Travancore to the Resident at Travancore, 13 April 1874, IOR/P/752, Proceedings of the 
Government of India in the Foreign Department, Judicial, October 1874, no. 24.  
  30 
British subjects, could be appointed Justices of the Peace with powers to try petty cases, with 
serious offences committed to the Travancore Sadr Court. He suggested that the appointment of 
the Justices of the Peace not be done by a unilateral act of the British Government but rather 
through an arrangement with Travancore.158 The Madras Government described the compromise 
as one deserving the ³PRVWDWWHQWLYHconsideration.´159  
 The Government of India consented WRWKH5HVLGHQW¶VDOWHUQDWLYHSURSRVDORQDFFRXQWRI
WKH³VSHFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVDIIHFWLQJWKH6WDWHVRI7UDYDQFRUHDQG&RFKLQDQGPRUHSDUWLFXODUO\
of the enlightened and progressive principles which have been followed by those States in their 
MXGLFLDO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´ 160  The Secretary of State for India also approved of the general 
principles governing criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects as well as the 
compromise in the Travancore case. However, he did not consider that Liddell, who had been 
released by Travancore after the completion of his sentence, had suffered any hardship as a result 
of his conviction, and so refused to ask Travancore to pay any compensation.161 As a result of 
this decision, princely states were required to consult the political officer posted at their court in 
the trial of European British subjects and were bound by his advice.  
 The Travancore case is an example of a dispute over the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by European colonial empires; such jurisdiction is often considered to be based on 
WKH LGHD RI D ³FLYLOL]DWLRQDO GLIIHUHQFH´ EHWZHHQ (XURSHDQV DQG QRQ-Europeans that required 
special privileges for Europeans. In the case of the princely states, the idea of such a difference 
was complicated by multiple factors: the British both did not claim jurisdiction over certain 
Europeans and did claim jurisdiction over those who were not European. Perhaps the most 
curious was the position of Americans and Europeans who were not British subjects. The 
*RYHUQPHQWRI,QGLDDGPLWWHGWKDW WKHVDPHFRQFHUQVRI³KHDWKHQ´ laws applied, yet it did not 
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include these subjects in its considerations. This was on account of concerns about the legality of 
extending British laws to foreign subjects in a foreign state. On several occasions, the British 
Government claimed jurisdiction over Americans and Europeans who were not British subjects 
on the ground RIEHLQJWKH³SDUDPRXQWSRZHU´DQGWRSUHYHQW³DZNZDUGGLSORPDWLFLQFLGHQWV´
but admitted that the question was controversial.162 A later memo clarified that Americans and 
Europeans who were not British subjects or in the service of the Crown did not have the right to 
be tried by British Indian courts. Instead princely states exercised jurisdiction over them subject 
to the control of British political officers who had the responsibility to ensure that foreigners 
received a fair trial since the British Government was responsible for the external affairs of the 
states.163 The states also retained jurisdiction over those European British subjects who were 
charged under state laws for acts that were not offences under British law; these included, for 
instance, offences against revenue laws.164 European British subjects in the service of princely 
states were also usually left to the jurisdiction of state courts.165 Another exception followed on 
account of the difficulty in determining what constituted a criminal case, with the British 
FRQWHQGLQJWKDW³WHFKQLFDO´FULPLQDOLW\VXFKDVWUHVSDVV166 existed on the boundary of civil and 
criminal questions, and could be dealt with by princely state courts.167 Further complicating the 
LGHDRI D³FLYLOL]DWLRQDOGLIIHUHQFH´ZDV WKH IDFW WKDW Whe British also claimed jurisdiction over 
persons who were not European British subjects. Most prominently, they claimed the right to 
exercise jurisdiction over British Indian subjects who were in the service of the Crown (i.e. those 
who were government personnel); these would include, for instance, postal or railway employees 
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who were posted in the princely states.168 
As these complexities demonstrate, tKHQRWLRQRID³FLYLOL]DWLRQDOGLIIHUHQFH´FRXOGQRW
fully encompass British claims to jurisdiction within entities like the princely states, which 
VWUDGGOHG WKHERXQGDULHVRI WKH ³LPSHULDO´ DQG WKH ³LQternational.´ In the Travancore case, the 
British Government argued that it possessed some (though not all) sovereign rights within the 
territory of princely states. By defining sovereignty as divisible, it was able to claim jurisdiction 
not only over European British subjects (on most occasions, at least), but also over British Indian 
subjects who were in charge of critical infrastructure works (such as railways and the postal 
service) in the states, while admitting that the states retained jurisdiction over most other people 
present in their territory. The idea of divisible sovereignty, therefore, enabled the British to 
establish and expand their control over the states, a position that was further facilitated by the 
notion of political precedent. The British buttressed their claim to jurisdiction over European 
British subjects apprehended in state territory by building on earlier decisions where the 
Government of India had refused to extradite European British subjects who were apprehended 
in British territory.169 Initially, this strategy of expanding British sovereign powers by building 
on earlier affirmations ran into a problem since Madhava Rao had specifically pointed170 to an 
1837 Government of India statement that provided³(XURSHDQVUHVLGLQJLQWhe territory of Native 
States, not being servants of the British Government, must be held in all respects, and in all 
FDVHV FLYLO DQG FULPLQDO VXEMHFW WR WKH ODZ RI WKH FRXQWU\ LQ ZKLFK WKH\ UHVLGH´ 171 
Consequently, the Government of India chose to engage in a move familiar in the common law: 
it distinguished the cases, arguing that earlier (unnamed) difficulties in the British exercise of 
MXULVGLFWLRQLQWKHVWDWHVKDGEHHQUHPRYHGE\OHJLVODWLRQWKHTXHVWLRQWKHUHIRUH³ZDVSODFHGRQ
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a different footing IURPWKDWRQZKLFKLWIRUPHUO\UHVWHG´172 The Liddell case then became the 
basis for British claims to jurisdiction over European British subjects in other princely states. 
Tupper, for instance, included it in Indian Political Practice as a precedent to be relied on.173 
Several later Political Department notes also relied on the case to articulate the general principle 
that princely states could not exercise criminal jurisdiction over European British subjects.174  
7UDYDQFRUH¶Vdiwans, Madhava Rao and Sashiah Shastri, sought to challenge this vision 
of divisible sovereignty and the significance of precedent, and thereby also the British colonial 
claim to powers of intervention in the states. In this, they relied on the idea of ³WHUULWRULal 
sovereignty.´ Both argued that there was a single entity that exercised jurisdiction over a 
particular piece of territory, in this case, Travancore. Therefore, they argued that the Travancore 
state had jurisdiction over everyone (regardless of nationality) within its territory, and hence, had 
the jurisdiction to try European British subjects who committed offences in state territory. Since 
jurisdiction was vested in a single entity, all jurisdictional powers were vested in the Travancore 
state, with other entities like the British Government being excluded from exercising jurisdiction 
in Travancore territory. This focus on a unified notion of sovereignty lent support to the efforts 
of the princely states to maintain their separate existence and limit British interference in their 
internal affairs through extraterritorial jurisdiction. Madhava Rao, in particular, had expressed 
his concerns about the pre-%ULWLVKSROLF\RIDQQH[DWLRQRIVWDWHVDQGDUJXHG WKDW³QDWLYH
DGPLQLVWUDWRUV´KDGDGXW\WRGHIHQGWKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVDQGHQVXUHWKHLUVXUYLYDO175  
One of the most significant ways to minimize colonial interference, Madhava Rao 
realized, was to develop the kind of administration that would win British approval.176 The 
SURGXFWRIDQ(QJOLVKHGXFDWLRQ0DGKDYD5DR³NQHZZKDWWKH%ULWLVKZDQWHGDQGKHZDVDEOH
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to give it to them; he played them successfully at their RZQ JDPH´177 Even though colonial 
control was established largely on the basis of divisible sovereignty and precedent, the British 
GLG UHO\ RQ WKH LGHD RI ³FLYLOL]DWLRQ´ LQ D VHFRQGDU\ PDQQHU they used it as the basis for an 
elaborate system of classificaWLRQRIWKHSULQFHO\VWDWHVZKHUHE\³PRUH´FLYLOL]HGVWDWHVHQMR\HG
WKHH[HUFLVHRIEURDGHUSRZHUV WKDQ³OHVV´FLYLOL]HGVWDWHV;178 states that wished to defend their 
sovereignty were, therefore, compelled to conform to British ideals of governance. During his 
tenure as diwan, Madhava Rao instituted a range of reform measures, including the 
establishment of a plantation economy and fiscal reforms to improve the finances of the state, the 
improvement of both the English and vernacular education systems of the state, the institution of 
competitive examinations for government jobs, and the construction of a wide-ranging public 
works system. 179  One of the rationales for the institution of these projects was to enable 
Travancore to take advantage of the colonial scheme of classification, but although the measures 
impressed the British, as Robin Jeffrey points out, they RQO\³VRXJKW WR µLPSURYH¶VRFLHW\DVD
ZKROH QRW WR DGMXVW UHODWLRQVKLSV DPRQJ LWV PHPEHUV´ 180  Rather than resulting in any 
meaningful social engineering, the reforms simply resulted in the development of a centralized, 
bureaucratic, efficient state that was capable of intervening more deeply in the lives of its 
citizens. The articulation of absolute, territorial sovereignty in disputes with the British 
Government was a crucial legal argument in this effort to empower state elites and bureaucrats 
and thereby also build administrative structures that would limit British interference.  
7UDYDQFRUH¶V FODLPV RI WHUULWRULDO VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG LWV VWDWus as a ³progressive´ state 
HQDEOHGWKHVWDWH¶VEXUHDXFUDWVWRQHJRWLDWHDFRPSURPLVHZLWKBritish colonial officials whereby 
Travancore judges could remain involved in the exercise of jurisdiction over European British 
subjects. Ultimately, however, it was the British idea of divisible sovereignty that won out in the 
dispute, and the universalization of the decision into a generally applicable political precedent 
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soon enabled the Government of India to claim extensive criminal jurisdiction within the 
territory of the princely states more generally.  
 
Baroda and Jurisdiction over Telegraphs 
 The telegraph-based communication system, established in South Asia in the second half 
of the nineteenth century,181 facilitated increasing levels of state surveillance, but also led to 
concerns about leaks of confidential information sent through the telegraph. Control over 
telegraph lines, therefore, was closely linked to the stability of British colonial rule.182 These 
security concerns extended to lines in the princely states as they were closely interwoven with 
British Indian territory. As a result, there were numerous disputes over the construction of 
telegraph lines within and across the states.183 A look at the development of the telegraph in 
Baroda can provide some insight.  
 In 1873, the Government of India granted the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India 
Railway Company (BBCIR, a private British company) a licence to operate the telegraph line 
that ran along the railway line between the towns of Miyagam and Dabhoi in Baroda; BBCIR 
already operated the railway line in question. It is unclear under what authority the licence was 
issued and there was no discussion about the legal framework that would govern the operation of 
the telegraph line. Ten years later, WKH*RYHUQPHQWRI,QGLDVRXJKW%DURGD¶VIRUPDOFRQVHQWIRU
the application of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1876 (a British Indian legislation) to the line, stating 
WKDWWKHPHDVXUHZDV³XVXDO´DQG³WKHQHFHVVLW\IRULWKDGHVFDSHGQRWLFH´HDUOLHU184  
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In response, the diwan of Baroda, Kazi Shahabuddin,185 argued that the Telegraph Act 
was not applicable to the line in question as it was ³constructed at the expense of the Baroda 
Government,´ was ³situated entirely in Baroda territory,´ and was ³under the jurisdiction of His 
+LJKQHVV¶V*RYHUQPHQW.´ After explicitly linking control over the telegraph line to its presence 
within Baroda territory, he went on to explain the role of the BBCIR. He claimed that the 
company was simply BarRGD¶VDJHQWRSHUDWLQJWKHline for and on behalf of the state, implying 
that Baroda continued to exercise ultimate authority over the telegraph line. Based on the claim 
that the princely states were separate legal entities from British India, he argued that as with any 
other statute passed by the British Indian legislature, the Telegraph Act did not apply to Baroda. 
Making the legislation applicable to the state would, he contended EH D ³detriment to the 
integrity of jurisdiction DQGRWKHUULJKWVRI+LV+LJKQHVV¶V*RYHUQPHQW.´186 Much like Madhava 
Rao and Sashiah Shastri had done in the Liddell case, Kazi Shahabuddin defended the %DURGD¶V
right to control activities in its territory.  
 The Government of India, however, GLVSXWHG6KDKDEXGGLQ¶VFODLPRQILQDQFHVDVVHUWLQJ
that the telegraph line had been constructed and was maintained at its cost, and not at the cost of 
the Baroda state. More significantly, it stated that the application of the Telegraph Act to the 
princely staWHVZDVQRW³DQXQXVXDOPHDVXUH´(giving the example of the state of Hyderabad as a 
precedent) and simply provided the advantage of uniformity across India.187 The Government of 
India later FODULILHG WKDW ZRXOG EH VDWLVILHG LI %DURGD HQDFWHG LWV RZQ ODZ ³IROORZLQJ WKH
SURYLVLRQV´RIWKH7HOHJUDSK$FWDQGWKHUXOHVthereunder.188 
 When the Baroda Telegraph Act was finally drafted,189 the grant of the operation licence 
by the Government of India became a point of contention. The diwan noted that there was no 
H[LVWLQJ HQJDJHPHQW EHWZHHQ %DURGD DQG WKH *RYHUQPHQW RI ,QGLD UHTXLULQJ WKH 9LFHUR\¶V
consent for the establishment of telegraph lines in Baroda territory. As a result, the draft Baroda 
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Act required the state to issue a licence to the BBCIR in supersession of the licence that had been 
issued by the Government of India. This was an indication that Baroda was attempting to retain 
as much control over the line as possible by claiming that it was the appropriate authority for the 
issue of licences in relation to telegraphs in state territory. The Agent to the Governor-General 
(AGG) at Baroda noted that the draft Act provided the state with the authority to make rules for 
the conduct of telegraph lines but did not take exception to this provision since it was framed 
PRUHDVDQ³DVVHUWLRQRI6WDWHSUHURJDWLYHWKDQZLWKDQ\YLHZRILQWHUIHULQJZLWKWKHZRUNLQJRI
WKHOLQH´190  
 The Government of India was not as relaxed about the assertion as the AGG, stating that 
Baroda was required to pass D ODZ ³LQ WKH VSLULW´ RI WKH 7HOHJUDSK $FW WKH PDLQ SULQFLSOH RI
which was to vest in the Governor-*HQHUDO ³FRPSOHWH FRQWURO´ RYHU WKH WHOHJUDSKLF V\VWHP LQ
British India. It argued that a Baroda enactment framed along those lines would have vested 
control over state telegraph lines in the Governor-General. Instead, the draft statute reserved that 
control to the state itself and would consequently defeat the British objective of securing control 
over the whole telegraphic system of the region. It therefore UHYHUWHGWRLWVGHPDQGIRU%DURGD¶V
FRQVHQW WR WKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKH7HOHJUDSK$FW WRWKHOLQH ,WDOVRREMHFWHGWR WKH³DVVHUWLRQRI
6WDWH SUHURJDWLYH´ E\ %DURGD LQ UHWDLQLQJ WKH SRZHU WR IUDPH UXOHV IRU WHOHJUDSK OLQHV DV
³LQDSSURSULDWH´ 191  The GovernmeQW RI ,QGLD¶V DUJXPHQWV UHOLHG RQ WKH LGHD that sovereign 
powers were divided between the British and the princely states. Consequently, the British 
Government could claim the exercise certain sovereign powers within the territory of the 
princely states; in this case, it happened to be the power to determine the law applicable to 
telegraph lines situated within state territory.  
  In the attempt to retain control over its telegraph lines, Baroda delayed granting consent 
for the application of the Telegraph Act to its territory for years. As a result, the construction of 
telegraph lines in the state ground to a halt. In 1890, the issue began to be pursued more 
vigorously, since there were increased fears of an accident on railway lines that did not have 
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parallel telegraph lines.192 The Government of India refused to permit construction until the state 
extended the Telegraph Act to Baroda territory.193 To resolve the issue, the diwan, Manibhai 
Jashbhai, RQH RI .D]L 6KDKDEXGGLQ¶V VXFFHVVRUV suggested a compromise. First, he proposed 
that the telegraph lines in Baroda that were connected with the general telegraph system of 
British India (as distinguished from local lines that lay completely within Baroda territory) 
would be worked according to the spirit of the Telegraph Act, with control (including the power 
to issue licences) vesting with the Government of India. Second, he argued that jurisdiction with 
respect to offences under the Telegraph Act on telegraph lines in Baroda continue to vest with 
%DURGD FRXUWV +H DUJXHG WKDW WKLV DUUDQJHPHQW ZRXOG SUHVHUYH %DURGD¶V ³jurisdictional 
integrity,´ while ensuring that through telegraph lines were worked on a general and uniform 
system.194  
 The AGG found the diwan¶V proposal satisfactory, 195  but the Government of India 
UHIXVHG WR DFFHSW DQ\WKLQJ ³VKRUW RI WKH FRPSOHWH DQG XQFRQGLWLRQDO DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH ,QGLDQ
7HOHJUDSK$FWE\WKH'DUEDUWRWKHOLQHVLQWKH%DURGD6WDWH´,WDOVRUHIXVHGWRDFFHSWDFDUYH-
out for local lines, demanding that the Telegraph Act be made applicable to all lines.196 After 
another two years, the diwan finally FRQYH\HG %DURGD¶V FRQVHQW WR WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH
7HOHJUDSK $FW ³WR DOO SUHVHQW DQG IXWXUH WHOHJUDSK OLQHV LQ WKH %DURGD 6WDWH WKDW PD\ EH
connected to the Imperial system, or, being isolated, may be thrown open to the public whose 
PHVVDJHV DUH FKDUJHG IRU´197 Jurisdiction over offences against the Telegraph Act, however, 
remained with Baroda courts, except in cases involving European British subjects.198  
                                                 
192
 Letter from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General at Baroda to the Foreign Secretary, Government of 
India, 6 May 1890, IOR/P/3742, Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Internal, July 
1890, no. 343.  
193
 Letter from the Public Works Secretary, Government of India to the Public Works Secretary, Government of 
Bombay, Railway Branch, 21 June 1890, IOR/P/3742, Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign 
Department, Internal, July 1890, no. 348.   
194
 Letter from the diwan of Baroda to the Agent to the Governor-General at Baroda, 11 August 1891, IOR/P/3968, 
Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Internal, October 1891, no. 319.  
195
 Letter from the Officiating Agent to the Governor-General at Baroda to the Foreign Secretary, Government of 
India, 15 August 1891, IOR/P/3968, Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Internal, 
October 1891, no. 318.  
196
 Letter from the Foreign Under-Secretary, Government of India to the Agent to the Governor-General at Baroda, 
13 October 1891, IOR/P/3968, Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Internal, October 
1891, no. 320.  
197
 Letter from the diwan of Baroda to the Agent to the Governor-General at Baroda, 1 February 1893, IOR/P/4401, 
Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Internal, August 1893, no. 59.  
198
 Letter from the Foreign Under-Secretary, Government of India to the Agent to the Governor-General at Baroda, 
18 July 1893, IOR/P/4401, Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, Internal, August 
1893, no. 69.  
  39 
As with the Travancore dispute over criminal jurisdiction%DURGD¶VGLVSXWHRYHUWKHODZV
to be applied to telegraph lines within its territory (a dispute over legislative jurisdiction) 
demonstrates the significance of the differing conceptions of sovereignty that the princely states 
and the British Government favoured. Baroda officials UHOLHG RQ WKH LGHD RI ³WHUULWRULDO
VRYHUHLJQW\´WRDUJXHWKDWWKHVWDWHZDVWKHexclusive and absolute sovereign over everything in 
its territory. Therefore, Baroda had the sole right to enact its own laws and to have its courts 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to telegraph lines within state territory even if the lines were 
part of a larger system connected with British India. Since the idea of territorial sovereignty 
implied that there was a single sovereign with respect to any piece of territory, Baroda officials 
argued that other entities such as the British Government could not exercise any sovereign 
authority over Baroda territory, i.e. over telegraph lines that lay completely within state territory.  
Much as Travancore bureaucrats had done, Baroda officials sought to establish a single 
point of legal authority within state territory. The similarity of arguments is, perhaps, 
XQVXUSULVLQJ DV0DGKDYD5DRKDGEHHQ.D]L6KDKDEXGGLQ¶V predecessor as diwan of Baroda, 
and had delivered a series of lectures to the minor ruler, Sayaji Rao III, emphasizing the 
importance of a well-run administration to minimize British interference in the state. 199 
Shahabuddin had served as the head of the finance department during Madhava Rao¶V tenure as 
diwan and had been his close confidante. 200  He also carried on the extensive reforms that 
Madhava Rao had started in the state, including changes to the land revenue system, investment 
in education through the opening of a number of schools, the institution of competitive 
examinations for the civil service, and the establishment of an extensive public works system. 
These were analogous to the reforms carried out in Travancore, and among the varied reasons 
they were carried out was the need to impress colonial officials and conform to British ideals of 
responsible rule. More significantly, these reforms included the institution of a bureaucracy that 
concentrated power in the hands of the diwan and his subordinates at the expense of local nobles 
who had traditionally enjoyed enormous privileges.201 Shahabuddin himself had been heavily 
involved in a similar effort of centralizing power during his tenure as the diwan of Kutch; there, 
he had pleaded WKHVWDWH¶VFDVHDJDLQVW%ULWLVK LQWHUIHUHQFH LQ UHODWLRQ WR WKHULJKWVRI WKH ORFDO
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zamindars (landholders).202 7KHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIVRYHUHLJQW\DV³DEVROXWH´DQG³WHUULWRULDO´LQWKH
course of disputes with the British Government fit with the princely stateV¶ general efforts to 
create strong, centralized governments in the late nineteenth century.  
 %DURGD¶VFODLPVRIWHUULWRULDOVRYHUHLJQW\RUHYHQLWVUHOLDQFHRQWKHVWDWXVDVD³PRGHO´
state did not go very far. British officials defined sovereignty as divisible to argue that certain 
sovereign powers in relation to the princely states vested with the British Government, with the 
remainder left to the Baroda state. As a result, the British Government claimed the power to 
determine the laws applicable to telegraph lines even if they lay completely within Baroda 
territory. British officials also used the precedent of other princely states like Hyderabad to argue 
that Baroda was required to apply British Indian legislation to and cede partial jurisdiction over 
telegraph lines within its territory7XSSHU¶VIndian Political Practice used the Baroda case itself 
as the basis of a generally applicable principle;203 soon other princely states were also deprived 
of control over telegraph lines.204 Relying on the twin principles of divisible sovereignty and 
precedent, therefore, enabled British officials to cement colonial control by integrating princely 
state infrastructure into the broader imperial system, but also claim that the states were 
³VRYHUHLJQ´ LQ the sense that they retained the exercise of jurisdiction over most offences 
committed along telegraph lines.  
 
Conclusion  
 The Travancore and Baroda disputes are only two of several late nineteenth-century 
jurisdictional conflicts between the princely states and the British Government. The vast colonial 
archives are brimming with debates over sovereignty that occurred in the everyday 
administration of the Empire, including in disputes with states like Bhopal205 and Hyderabad.206 
As the two case studies I have discussed in this article demonstrate, the colonial encounter in 
South Asia generated two versions of sovereignty: absolute and divisible.  
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British jurists like Henry Maine insisted WKDWVRYHUHLJQW\ZDV³GLYLVLEOH´so entities like 
the princely staWHV ZHUH VRYHUHLJQV ³RI D FHUWDLQ NLQG´ WR ZKLFK LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ DSSOLed ³LQ
VRPHVHQVH´Political officers in the Government of India (such as Charles Aitchison, Charles 
Lewis Tupper, and William Lee-Warner) adopted this view of sovereignty and also built on 
0DLQH¶V LQVLJKWV WR develop a system of precedent as a mechanism to determine the specific 
division of sovereign powers between the states and the British Government. Parsing through the 
post-1857 shift in British imperial ideology towards maintainiQJ ³QDWLYH´ UXOH LV FULWLFDO to 
understand these two moves. The construction of the states as entities that only possessed some 
sovereign powers with the remainder being exercised by the British Government was seen as 
both historical fact (since Maine argued that ³WUDGLWLRQDO´ $VLDQ VRFLHWLHV ZHUH GLIIHUHQW IURP
³PRGHUQ´FHQWUDOL]HG(XURSHDQQDWLRQ-states) and a tremendously forceful legal argument that 
balanced the imperial push towards extensive British jurisdiction in the states and the political 
need to maintain the princes as allies. This latter assertion was also enabled by the system of 
precedent, in terms of which determinations made in a specific case were universalized into 
general principles and considered to be applicable to all states. The reliance on examples of the 
historical exercise of power soon enabled the British to UHGXFH WKH SULQFHV¶ JXDUDQWHHV XQGHU
individual WUHDWLHVWRPHUH³VFUDSVRISDSHU´207 and entrench their paramountcy in the region.   
By simultaneously recognizing the states as sovereign and not so, colonial officials 
softened the divide between the imperial and the international and reinforced the significance of 
legal arguments made in the course of the jurisdictional disputes that permeated British relations 
with the princely states. Law in general, and the concept of sovereignty in particular, became the 
language that the participants in these disputes used to articulate their differences.208 And since 
sovereignty is capable of being defined in multiple ways, the princely states relied on a different 
set of arguments, claiming that sovereignty was absolute, unitary, and linked with the control of 
territory; they were, therefore, entitled to exercise all sovereign rights within their territory. The 
³VRYHUHLJQW\DVWHUULWRU\´DUJXPHQWKDGWZRmain aims. The first was to limit British interference 
in the internal affairs of the states, which was intensifying in the late nineteenth century. In this, 
the princes and their advisors can be situated within a broader tradition of protest against colonial 
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authorities. Madhava Rao, for instance, relied on the international law treatise authored by Emer 
de Vattel that, tellingly, was also a source of inspiration to American colonists who had rebelled 
against British authorities a century prior. 209  The ³WHUULWRULDO VRYHUHLJQW\´ argument of the 
princely states is also similar to the ³DEVROXWH VRYHUHLJQW\´ claim of nineteenth-century 
international lawyers IURP WKH ³VHPL-SHULSKHU\´ to argue for autonomy and equality.210 In the 
case of the princely states, the idea of territorial sovereignty was not only externalized as a 
defence against British interference, but also had a second, inter-linked aim that was directed 
inwards. During the late nineteenth century, many states were engaged in the task of creating 
centralized, bureaucratic states. Although this effort met a variety of goals, it also helped to 
maintain the façade of well-administered states to minimize British intervention. It was 
frequently carried out at the expense of local nobles, who often exercised tremendous influence 
that had the potential to undercut monarchical authority within the state.211 For instance, as a 
Marathi brahmin in Travancore, Madhava Rao was himself the beneficiary of a common move 
by ruling princes of importing western-educated administrators from outside the state to replace 
local nobles who had an independent power base within the state.212 In addition to engaging in 
legislative and administrative activities to counter the power of the nobility and to intervene 
more extensively in the lives of their subjects, states also moulded an image of centralized 
control through the idea of territorial sovereignty.  
To some extent, studying the princely states can also provide us with a basis for 
investigating the broader role that the doctrine of sovereignty played in political struggles across 
the British Empire. As India was the ideological and economic foundation of the Empire and the 
basis upon which it expanded across Asia and Africa,213 LWSURYLGHG³LQVSLUDWLRQSUHFHGHQWVDQG
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SHUVRQQHO IRU FRORQLDO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´ 214  The model of ³GLYLVLEOH VRYHUHLJQW\´ WKDW ZDV
articulated in the context of the princely states was consciously exported to other parts of the 
Empire, including the Persian Gulf states, the Malay states, Uganda, and northern Nigeria.215 
Nevertheless, indirect rule did not look alike in these different places as colonial officials quickly 
adapted general ideas to suit specific contexts. Even the Malay states and northern Nigeria, 
considered to be heavily influenced by the princely state model, ended up being under greater 
direct supervision of British officials than the princely states ever were.216 The princely states 
were, therefore, considered to be sui generis, both by British217 and state officials.218 Although 
other local rulers made arguments in the language of sovereignty, in comparison with other 
indirectly ruled territories within the British Empire, tKH SULQFHO\ VWDWHV¶ VRYHUHLJQW\ KDG WKH
most substance,219 at least during colonial rule.220 International law, as David Kennedy argues, 
means different things to different people in different places.221 Even within South Asia, the 
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versions of sovereignty articulated by the British and the states in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century did not remain static during the entire period of colonial rule. While legal language 
continued to provide a fertile means for debate, the strengthening of anti-colonial nationalism at 
the turn of the century reconfigured relations between the British and the princes and led to new 
sets of arguments about sovereignty and political order.222   
Although the specific late nineteenth-century context is important, there are two ways in 
which the particular history that I have traced in this article assumes broader significance. First, 
it highlights the fact that both British colonial authorities and the princely states constructed 
themselves and their notions of political order through the articulation of versions of sovereignty 
in the course of jurisdictional disputes. Sovereignty was a concept that gained multiple meanings 
and justifications over time, as a variety of players attempted to use, manipulate, cannibalize, 
reimagine, and structure the idea in different ways to give shape to their often-conflicting visions 
for imperial and global order. It also retained this creative role after decolonization, as seen in the 
long afterlife of WKH³WHUULWRULDOVRYHUHLJQW\´DUJXPHQWRIthe princely states, which was taken up 
with increasing vigour by anti-colonial nationalists in the aftermath of Indian independence in 
1947.223 More generally, the absolutist conceptualization of sovereignty formed the basis of the 
principles of non-interference and territorial integrity, prized by many newly-independent 
nations in the mid-twentieth century in their efforts to minimize neo-colonial intervention and 
build a more equitable international order.224 Unravelling the complex history of sovereignty in 
the colonial context then, can help us to understand the history of the various ways in which 
people have thought about organizing the world and their relationships with each other. 
Arguments about sovereignty were and remain a reflection of broader discussions over where the 
realms of the ³QDWLRQDO´DQGthe ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO´Oie, i.e. they aUHGHEDWHVRYHUWKH³ERXQGDULHVRI
WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO´Wracing this history is, therefore, key to understanding international law itself.  
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Second, the sovereignty arguments made in the particular context of late nineteenth-
century South Asia also map on to a broader understanding of the relationship between law and 
empire. In recent years, historians have moved beyond binary notions of law as either being a 
mechanism of imperial oppression or a tool in the hands of colonized peoples to fight such 
subjugation. Colonialism was violent, ruthless, and exclusionary, and so even though legal 
concepts are malleable, on account of the limitations of the colonial context and the inequalities 
of power relations, it is difficult to think of colonized peoples who made legal arguments as 
agency wielding heroes. This is particularly true in the case of the princes and their bureaucrats, 
who did not demand political freedom and social revolution, but rather were engaged in the task 
of carving out a space for state elites in the struggle for power.225 But rather than view such 
actors as collaborators on account of their reliance on the colonial legal system, it is important to 
recognize the complexity of the interplay of voices, interests, and demands in the shaping of 
law.226 Conflict was a part of the framework; it was the very essence of imperial legal structures.  
Charting out the details of colonial-era debates over legal concepts such as sovereignty 
can also help us to understand processes of domination and resistance in the contemporary 
world.227  For instance, debates over humanitarian intervention have played out in a manner 
similar to imperial legal disputes over jurisdiction, illustrating the doubledness of the concept of 
VRYHUHLJQW\6RDUJXPHQWVRYHUWKHOHJDOLW\RIPLOLWDU\DFWLRQE\WKH³LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\´
for the purposes of upholding ideals such as democracy or human rights revolve around the 
construction of particular versions of sovereignty, i.e. whether the sovereignty of a state is 
UHJDUGHGDV³DEVROXWH´RUZKHWKHUVRYHUHLJQW\LVLQWHUSUHWHGDVEHLQJGHSHQGHQWRQIDFWRUVVXFK
DVWKHSURYLVLRQRI³JRRGJRYHUQPHQW´RUWKHSURWHFWLRQRIKXPDQULJKWV228  
By focusing on the multiple iterations of concepts like sovereignty by a variety of actors 
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over time, we can understand the crucial role played by conflict and struggle in the creation of 
the legal architecture of the world. As I have argued in this article, the language of international 
law, and of sovereignty in particular, was all-encompassing; throughout the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, it was used a means to debate and resolve disputes, and continues to be a 
forum for the negotiation of political power even today. Legal forms and practices, therefore, are 
political products that arise from the contests of clashing social groups, rather than being 
timeless and neutral arbiters of social and political disputes; hence, they are contingent and 
capable of being challenged. As a result, international law, and the concept of sovereignty in 
particular, is a field of conflict, a site of struggle. 
